Dangerous human-made interference with climate: A GISS modelE study by Hansen, J. et al.
1.	 Introduction
	 The	Earth’s	 atmospheric	 composition	 and	 surface	proper-
ties	are	being	altered	by	human	activities.	Some	of	 the	altera-
tions	are	as	large	or	larger	than	natural	atmosphere	and	surface	
changes,	even	compared	with	natural	changes	that	have	occurred	
over	hundreds	of	thousands	of	years.	There	is	concern	that	these	
human-made	alterations	could	substantially	alter	the	Earth’s	cli-
mate,	which	has	led	to	the	United	Nations	Framework	Conven-
tion	on	Climate	Change	[United Nations,	1992]	with	the	agreed	
objective	“to	achieve	stabilization	of	greenhouse	gas	concentra-
tions	in	the	atmosphere	at	a	level	that	would	prevent	dangerous	
anthropogenic	interference	with	the	climate	system.”
	 The	Earth’s	climate	system	has	great	thermal	inertia,	requir-
ing	at	least	several	decades	to	adjust	to	a	change	of	climate	forc-
ing	[Hansen et al.,	1984].	Anthropogenic	physical	infrastructure	
giving	rise	to	changes	of	atmospheric	composition,	such	as	pow-
er	plants	and	transportation	systems,	also	has	a	time	constant	for	
change	of	several	decades.	Thus	there	is	a	need	to	anticipate	the	
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We	investigate	the	issue	of	“dangerous	human-made	interference	with	climate”	using	
simulations	with	GISS	modelE	driven	by	measured	or	estimated	forcings	for	1880-2003	and	
extended	to	2100	for	IPCC	greenhouse	gas	scenarios	as	well	as	the	‘alternative’	scenario	of	
Hansen and Sato [2004]. Identification of ‘dangerous’ effects is partly subjective, but we find 
evidence	that	added	global	warming	of	more	than	1ºC	above	the	level	in	2000	has	effects	that	
may	be	highly	disruptive.	The	alternative	scenario,	with	peak	added	forcing	~1.5	W/m2	in	2100,	
keeps	further	global	warming	under	1°C	if	climate	sensitivity	is	~3ºC	or	less	for	doubled	CO2.	
The alternative scenario keeps mean regional seasonal warming within 2σ (standard deviations) 
of	20th century variability, but other scenarios yield regional changes of 5-10σ, i.e., mean 
conditions outside the range of local experience. We discuss three specific sub-global topics: 
Arctic climate change, tropical storm intensification, and ice sheet stability. We suggest that 
Arctic climate change has been driven as much by pollutants (O3,	its	precursor	CH4, and soot) as 
by	CO2,	offering	hope	that	dual	efforts	to	reduce	pollutants	and	slow	CO2	growth	could	minimize	
Arctic	change.	Simulated	recent	ocean	warming	in	the	region	of	Atlantic	hurricane	formation	is	
comparable to observations, suggesting that greenhouse gases (GHGs) may have contributed to 
a trend toward greater hurricane intensities. Increasing GHGs cause significant warming in our 
model	in	submarine	regions	of	ice	shelves	and	shallow	methane	hydrates,	raising	concern	about	
the	potential	for	accelerating	sea	level	rise	and	future	positive	feedback	from	methane	release.	
Growth	of	non-CO2	forcings	has	slowed	in	recent	years,	but	CO2	emissions	are	now	surging	well	
above	the	alternative	scenario.	Prompt	actions	to	slow	CO2	emissions	and	decrease	non-CO2	
forcings	are	needed	to	achieve	the	low	forcing	of	the	alternative	scenario.
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nature of anthropogenic climate change and define the level of 
change	constituting	dangerous	interference	with	nature.	Simula-
tions	with	global	climate	models	on	the	century	time	scale	pro-
vide	a	 tool	 for	 addressing	 that	need.	Climate	models	used	 for	
simulations	of	future	climate	must	be	tested	by	means	of	simula-
tions	of	past	climate	change.
	 We	carry	out	climate	simulations	using	GISS	atmospheric	
modelE	documented	by	Schmidt et al.	[2006],	hereafter	modelE	
[2006]. Specifically, we attach the model III version of atmo-
spheric modelE to the computationally efficient ocean model of 
Russell et al.	[1995].	This	coupled	model	and	its	climate	sensi-
tivity	have	been	documented	by	a	large	set	of	simulations	car-
ried out to investigate the “efficacy” of various climate forcings 
[Hansen et al.,	 2005a],	 hereafter	Efficacy	 [2005].	We	 use	 the	
same	model	III	here	for	transient	climate	simulations	for	1880-
2100,	with	a	few	simulations	extended	to	2300.
	 We	made	 calculations	 for	 each	 of	 ten	 individual	 climate	
forcings	 for	 the	 period	 1880-2003,	 as	well	 as	 for	 all	 forcings	
acting	together.	The	simulations	using	all	ten	forcings	were	ex-
tended	into	the	future	using	scenarios	of	atmospheric	composi-
tion defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[IPCC, 2001] and two scenarios defined by Hansen and Sato	
[2004].	The	simulations	for	1880-2003	with	individual	forcings	
are	described	by	Hansen et al.	 [2006b].	Extensive	diagnostics	
and	convenient	graphics	for	all	of	the	runs	are	available	at	data.
giss.nasa.gov/modelE/transient.	Diagnostics	 for	 extended	 runs	
with	all	forcings	acting	at	once	are	also	available	from	the	of-
ficial IPCC repository (www-pcmdi.llnl.gov/ipcc/about_ipcc.
php). 
 Section 2 defines the climate model and summarizes prin-
cipal known deficiencies. Section 3 defines time-dependent cli-
mate	 forcings	 that	 we	 employ.	 Section	 4	 examines	 simulated	
global temperature change and specific regional climate change 
issues.	Section	5	compares	trends	of	actual	climate	forcings	and	
those	 in	 the	 scenarios.	Section	6	 summarizes	 the	 relevance	of	
our results to the basic question: is there still time to avoid dan-
gerous	human	interference	with	climate?
2.	Climate	Model
2.1.		 Atmospheric	Model
	 The	atmospheric	model	employed	here	is	the	20-layer	ver-
sion	of	GISS	modelE	 [2006]	with	4°x5°	horizontal	resolution.	
This	resolution	is	coarse,	but	use	of	second-order	moments	for	
numerical	differencing	improves	the	effective	resolution	for	the	
transport	of	tracers.	The	model	top	is	at	0.1	hPa.	Minimal	drag	
is	applied	in	the	stratosphere,	as	needed	for	numerical	stability,	
without	gravity	wave	modeling.	Stratospheric	zonal	winds	and	
temperature	are	generally	realistic	[Figure	17	in	Efficacy,	2005],	
but	the	polar	lower	stratosphere	is	as	much	as	5-10°C	too	cold	in	
the	winter	and	the	model	produces	sudden	stratospheric	warm-
ings	at	only	a	quarter	of	the	observed	frequency.	Model	capabili-
ties	and	limitations	are	described	in	Efficacy	[2005]	and	modelE	
[2006]. Deficiencies are summarized below (section 2.4).
2.2.		 Ocean	Representation
	 In	 this	paper	we	use	 the	dynamic	ocean	model	of	Russell 
et al. [1995]. One merit of this ocean model is its efficiency, as 
it	adds	negligible	computation	time	to	that	for	 the	atmosphere	
when	the	ocean	horizontal	resolution	is	the	same	as	that	for	the	
atmosphere,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 here.	There	 are	 13	ocean	 layers	 of	
geometrically	increasing	thickness,	four	of	these	in	the	top	100	
m.	The	ocean	model	employs	the	KPP	parameterization	for	ver-
tical	mixing	[Large et al.,	1994]	and	the	Gent-McWilliams	pa-
rameterization	 for	 eddy-induced	 tracer	 transports	 [Gent et al.,	
1995;	Griffies,	1998].	The	resulting	Russell et al.	[1995]	ocean	
model	 produces	 a	 realistic	 thermohaline	 circulation	 [Sun and 
Bleck,	2006],	but	yields	unrealistically	weak	El	Nino-like	vari-
ability	as	a	result	of	its	coarse	resolution.
	 Interpretation	of	climate	simulations	and	observed	climate	
change	 is	 aided	by	 simulations	with	 the	 identical	atmospheric	
model	 attached	 to	 alternative	ocean	 representations.	We	make	
calculations	with	 the	 same	 time-dependent	1880-2003	climate	
forcings of this paper and same atmospheric model attached to: 
(1) ocean A, which uses observed sea surface temperature (SST) 
and sea ice (SI) histories of Rayner et al. [2003]; (2) ocean B, 
the Q-flux ocean [Hansen et al.,	 1984;	Russell et al.,	 1985],	
with specified horizontal ocean heat transports inferred from the 
ocean	A	control	run	and	diffusive	uptake	of	heat	anomalies	by	
the deep ocean; (3) ocean C, the dynamic ocean model of Rus-
sell et al. [1995]; (4) ocean D, the Bleck	[2002]	HYCOM	ocean	
model.	Results	for	ocean	A	and	B	are	included	in	Hansen et al.	
[2006b] and on our (GISS) web site, results for ocean C are in 
this	paper	and	our	web	site,	and	results	for	ocean	D	will	be	pre-
sented	elsewhere	and	on	our	web	site.
2.3.		 Model	Sensitivity
	 The	 model	 has	 sensitivity	 2.7°C	 for	 doubled	 CO2	 when	
coupled to the Q-flux ocean [Efficacy,	2005],	but	2.9°C	when	
coupled	to	the	Russell et al.	[1995]	dynamical	ocean.	The	slight-
ly	 higher	 sensitivity	with	 ocean	C	became	 apparent	when	 the	
model	run	was	extended	to	1000	years,	as	the	sea	ice	contribu-
tion	to	climate	change	became	more	important	relative	to	other	
feedbacks	as	 the	high	 latitude	ocean	 temperatures	 approached	
equilibrium.	The	 2.9°C	 sensitivity	 corresponds	 to	 ~0.7°C	 per	
W/m2.	In	the	coupled	model	with	the	Russell et al.	[1995]	ocean	
the	response	to	a	constant	forcing	is	such	that	50%	of	the	equi-
librium	response	is	achieved	in	~25	years,	75%	in	~150	years,	
and	 the	 equilibrium	 response	 is	 approached	only	 after	 several	
hundred	years.	Runs	of	1000	years	and	longer	are	available	on	
the	GISS	web	site.	The	model’s	climate	sensitivity	of	2.7-2.9°C	
for	doubled	CO2	is	well	within	the	empirical	range	of	3±1°C	for	doubled	CO2	that	has	been	inferred	from	paleoclimate	evidence	[Hansen et al.,	1984,	1993;	Hoffert and Covey,	1992].
2.4.		 Principal	Model	Deficiencies
	 ModelE	[2006]	compares	the	atmospheric	model	climatol-
ogy	with	observations.	Model	 shortcomings	 include	~25%	re-
gional deficiency of summer stratus cloud cover off the west 
coast	 of	 the	 continents	with	 resulting	 excessive	 absorption	 of	
solar	radiation	by	as	much	as	50	W/m2, deficiency in absorbed 
solar	radiation	and	net	radiation	over	other	tropical	regions	by	
typically	20	W/m2,	sea	level	pressure	too	high	by	4-8	hPa	in	the	
winter	in	the	Arctic	and	2-4	hPa	too	low	in	all	seasons	in	the	trop-
ics, ~20% deficiency of rainfall over the Amazon basin, ~25% 
deficiency in summer cloud cover in the western United States 
and	central	Asia	with	a	corresponding	~5°C	excessive	summer	
warmth	in	these	regions.	In	addition	to	the	inaccuracies	in	the	
simulated	climatology,	another	shortcoming	of	the	atmospheric	
model	 for	 climate	 change	 studies	 is	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 gravity	
wave	representation,	as	noted	above,	which	may	affect	the	na-
ture	 of	 interactions	 between	 the	 troposphere	 and	 stratosphere.	
The	stratospheric	variability	is	less	than	observed,	as	shown	by	
analysis	of	the	present	20-layer	4°x5°	atmospheric	model	by	J.	
Perlwitz	 [personal	 communication].	 In	 a	 50-year	 control	 run	
Perlwitz finds that the interannual variability of seasonal mean 
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temperature	in	the	stratosphere	maximizes	in	the	region	of	the	
subpolar	jet	streams	at	realistic	values,	but	the	model	produces	
only six sudden stratospheric warmings (SSWs) in 50 years, 
compared	with	about	one	every	two	years	in	the	real	world.
	 The	 coarse	 resolution	 Russell	 ocean	 model	 has	 realistic	
overturning	 rates	 and	 inter-ocean	 transports	 [Sun and Bleck,	
2006],	but	tropical	SST	has	less	east-west	contrast	than	observed	
and	the	model	yields	only	slight	El	Nino-like	variability	[Figure	
17,	Efficacy,	2005].	Also	the	Southern	Ocean	is	too	well-mixed	
near	Antarctica	[Liu et al.,	2003],	deep	water	production	in	the	
North	Atlantic	Ocean	does	not	go	deep	enough,	and	some	deep-
water	formation	occurs	in	the	Sea	of	Okhotsk	region,	probably	
because	 of	 unrealistically	 small	 freshwater	 input	 there	 in	 the	
model	III	version	of	modelE.	Global	sea	ice	cover	is	realistic,	
but	this	is	achieved	with	too	much	sea	ice	in	the	Northern	Hemi-
sphere	 and	 too	 little	 sea	 ice	 in	 the	Southern	Hemisphere,	 and	
the	seasonal	cycle	of	sea	ice	is	too	damped	with	too	much	ice	
remaining	 in	 the	Arctic	 summer,	which	may	 affect	 the	 nature	
and	distribution	of	sea	ice	climate	feedbacks.
	 Despite	these	model	limitations,	in	IPCC	model	inter-com-
parisons	 the	model	used	for	 the	simulations	reported	here,	 i.e,	
modelE	with	the	Russell	ocean,	fares	about	as	well	as	the	typi-
cal	global	model	in	the	verisimilitude	of	its	climatology.	Com-
parisons	so	far	include	the	ocean’s	thermohaline	circulation	[Sun 
and Bleck,	2006],	the	ocean’s	heat	uptake	[Forest et al.,	2006],	
the	 atmosphere’s	 annular	 variability	 and	 response	 to	 forcings	
[Miller et al.,	2006],	and	radiative	forcing	calculations	[Collins 
et al.,	2006].	The	ability	of	the	GISS	model	to	match	climatol-
ogy,	compared	with	other	models,	varies	from	being	better	than	
average on some fields (radiation quantities, upper tropospheric 
temperature) to poorer than average on others (stationary wave 
activity, sea level pressure).
3.	Climate	Forcings
	 Climate	forcings	driving	our	simulated	climate	change	dur-
ing	1880-2003	arise	from	changing	well-mixed	greenhouse	gas-
es (GHGs), ozone (O3), stratospheric H2O from methane (CH4) 
oxidation, tropospheric aerosols, specifically, sulfates, nitrates, 
black carbon (BC) and organic carbon (OC), a parameterized 
indirect	 effect	 of	 aerosols	 on	 clouds,	 volcanic	 aerosols,	 solar	
irradiance,	 soot	 effect	 on	 snow	 and	 ice	 albedos,	 and	 land	 use	
changes.	Global	maps	of	each	of	these	forcings	for	1880-2000	
are	provided	in	Efficacy	[2005].
	 Figure	 1	 shows	 the	 time	 dependence	 of	 the	 global	mean	
effective	 forcings.	Changes	 in	 the	quantitative	values	of	 these	
forcings that occur with alternative forcing definitions, which 
are	small	in	most	cases,	are	discussed	in	Efficacy	[2005]	and	in	
conjunction	with	the	transient	simulations	for	1880-2003	[Han-
sen et al.,	2006b].	The	predominant	forcings	are	due	to	GHGs	
and	aerosols,	including	the	aerosol	indirect	effect.	Ozone	forc-
ing is significant on the century time scale, and the more uncer-
tain	 solar	 forcing	may	 also	 be	 important.	Volcanic	 effects	 are	
large	on	short	time	scales	and	temporal	clustering	of	volcanoes	
contributes	to	decadal	variability.	Soot	effect	on	snow	and	ice	al-
bedos	and	land	use	change	are	small	global	forcings,	but	can	be	
large	on	regional	scales.	Efficacy	[2005],	this	paper,	and	detailed	
simulations	for	1880-2003	[Hansen et al.,	2006b]	all	use	GHG	
forcings as defined in Figure 1.
	 GHG	climate	forcing,	including	O3	and	CH4-derived	strato-spheric	H2O,	is	Fe	~	3	W/m2.	Our	partly	subjective	estimate	of	uncertainty,	including	imprecision	in	gas	amounts	and	radiative	
transfer	is	~±15%,	i.e.,	±0.45	W/m2.	Comparisons	with	line-by-
line	radiation	calculations	[Collins et al.,	2006]	suggest	that	the	
CO2,	CH4	 and	N2O	 forcings	 in	Model	 III	 are	 accurate	within	several	percent,	but	the	CFC	forcing	may	be	30-40%	too	large.	
If	that	correction	is	needed,	it	will	reduce	our	estimated	green-
house	gas	forcing	to	Fe	~	2.9	W/m2.
	 Stratospheric	 aerosol	 forcing	 following	 the	 1991	 Mount	
Pinatubo	 volcanic	 eruption	 is	 probably	 accurate	 within	 20%,	
based	on	a	strong	constraint	provided	by	satellite	measurements	
of	planetary	radiation	budget	[Wong et al.,	2004],	as	illustrated	
in	Figure	11	of	Efficacy	 [2005].	The	uncertainty	 increases	 for	
earlier	 eruptions,	 reaching	 about	 ±50%	 for	Krakatau	 in	 1883.	
Between	 large	 eruptions	 prior	 to	 the	 satellite	 era,	when	 small	
eruptions	might	escape	detection,	minimum	stratospheric	aero-
sol	forcing	uncertainty	was	~0.5	W/m2.
	 Tropospheric	aerosols	are	based	on	emissions	estimates	and	
aerosol	transport	modeling,	as	described	by	Koch	[2001].	Their	
indirect	effect	is	a	parameterization	based	on	empirical	effects	
of	aerosols	on	cloud	droplet	number	concentration	[Menon and 
Del Genio,	2006]	as	described	in	Efficacy	[2005].	Aerosol	forc-
ings are defined in detail by Hansen et al.	[2006b].	The	net	direct	
aerosol	 forcing	 is	Fe	=	-0.60	W/m2	and	 the	 total	aerosol	 forc-
ing	 is	Fe	=	-1.37	W/m2	for	1880-2003.	Our	 largely	subjective	
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Figure	1. Effective global climate forcings (Fe) employed in our global climate simulations, relative to their 
values	in	1880.	Use	of	Fe	avoids	exaggerating	the	importance	of	BC	and	O3	forcings.
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estimate	of	the	uncertainty	in	the	net	aerosol	forcing	is	at	least	
50%.
	 The	sum	of	all	forcings	is	Fe	~	1.90	W/m2	for	1880-2003.	
However,	the	net	forcing	is	evaluated	more	accurately	from	an	
ensemble	of	simulations	carried	out	with	all	forcings	present	at	
the	 same	 time	 [Efficacy,	 2005],	 thus	 accounting	 for	 any	 non-
linearity	in	the	combination	of	forcings	and	minimizing	the	ef-
fect of noise (unforced variability) in the climate model runs. All 
forcings	acting	together	yield	Fe	~	1.75	W/m2.
	 Uncertainty	in	the	net	forcing	for	1880-2003	is	dominated	
by	the	aerosol	forcing	uncertainty,	which	is	at	least	50%.	Given	
our	estimates,	we	must	conclude	that	the	net	forcing	is	uncertain	
by	~	1	W/m2.	Therefore	the	smallest	and	largest	forcings	within	
the	 range	of	uncertainty	differ	by	more	 than	a	 factor	of	 three,	
primarily	because	of	the	absence	of	accurate	measurements	of	
aerosol	direct	and	indirect	forcings.
	 One	 implication	 of	 the	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 net	 1880-2003	
climate	forcing	is	that	it	is	fruitless	to	try	to	obtain	an	accurate	
empirical	climate	sensitivity	from	observed	global	temperature	
change	of	the	past	century.	However,	paleoclimate	evidence	of	
climate	 change	 between	 periods	 with	 well-known	 boundary	
conditions (forcings) provides a reasonably precise measure 
of climate sensitivity: 3±1°C for doubled CO2	 [Hansen et al.,	1984,	1993;	Hoffert and Covey,	1992].	Thus	we	conclude	that	
our	model	sensitivity	of	2.9°C	for	doubled	CO2	is	reasonable.	 Figure	1b	indicates	that,	except	for	occasional	large	volca-
nic	eruptions,	 the	GHG	climate	forcing	has	become	the	domi-
nant	global	climate	forcing	during	the	past	few	decades.	GHG	
dominance	 is	a	 result	of	 the	slowing	growth	of	anthropogenic	
aerosols,	as	increased	aerosol	amounts	in	developing	countries	
have	been	at	least	partially	balanced	by	decreases	in	developed	
countries.	This	dominance	of	GHG	forcing,	with	a	net	forcing	
that	may	be	 approaching	 the	 equivalence	of	 a	 1%	 increase	 in	
solar	irradiance,	implies	that	global	temperature	change	should	
now	be	rising	above	the	level	of	natural	climate	variability.
	 Furthermore,	we	can	anticipate	that	the	dominance	of	GHG	
forcing	over	aerosol	and	other	forcings	will	be	all	the	more	true	
in	 the	future	[Andreae et al.,	2005].	There	 is	 little	expectation	
that	developing	countries	will	allow	aerosol	amounts	to	continue	
to	grow	rapidly,	as	their	aerosol	pollution	is	already	hazardous	
to	human	health	and	technologies	to	reduce	emissions	are	avail-
able.	If	future	GHG	amounts	are	anywhere	near	the	projections	
in	typical	IPCC	scenarios,	GHG	climate	forcings	will	be	domi-
nant	in	the	future.	Thus,	we	suggest,	it	is	possible	to	make	mean-
ingful	projections	of	future	climate	change	despite	uncertainties	
in	past	aerosol	forcings.
	 IPCC [2001] defines a broad range of scenarios for future 
greenhouse	gas	amounts.	This	range	is	shown	nominally	by	the	
colored	area	in	Figure	2,	which	is	bordered	by	the	two	IPCC	sce-
narios	that	give	the	largest	and	smallest	greenhouse	gas	amounts	
in	2100.	We	carry	out	climate	simulations	for	three	IPCC	sce-
narios: A2, A1B and B1. A2 and B1 are, respectively, near the 
maximum	and	minimum	of	the	range	of	IPCC	[2001]	scenarios,	
and	A1B	is	known	as	the	IPCC	midrange	baseline	scenario.
	 We	 also	 carry	 out	 simulations	 for	 the	 “alternative”	 and	
“2°C” scenarios (Figure 2) defined in Table 2 of Hansen and 
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Figure	2.	Observed	greenhouse	gas	amounts	as	tabulated	by	Hansen and Sato	[2004]	and	scenarios	for	the	
21st	century.	Colored	area	delineates	extreme	IPCC	[2001]	scenarios.	Alternative	and	2°C	scenarios	are	from	
Table	2	of	Hansen and Sato	[2004].	MPTGs	and	OTGs	are	Montreal	Protocol	trace	gases	and	other	trace	
gases	[Hansen and Sato,	2004].	Forcings	on	right	hand	scales	are	adjusted	forcings,	Fa,	relative	to	values	in	
2000.
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Sato	 [2004].	 CO2	 increases	 75	 ppm	 during	 2000-2050	 in	 the	alternative	scenario;	CH4	decreases	moderately,	enough	to	bal-ance	a	steady	increase	of	N2O; chlorofluorocarbons 11 and 12 decrease	enough	to	balance	the	increase	of	all	other	trace	gases,	
an	assumption	that	is	handled	by	having	all	these	gases	remain	
constant	after	2000.	CO2	peaks	at	475	ppm	in	2100	in	the	alter-native	scenario,	while	CH4	decreases	to	1300	ppb.	The	alterna-tive	scenario	 is	designed	 to	keep	 the	added	forcing	at	about	1	
W/m2	in	2000-2050	and	another	0.5	W/m2	in	2050-2100.	With	a	
nominal	climate	sensitivity	of	¾°C	per	W/m2	and	slowly	declin-
ing	greenhouse	gas	amounts	after	2100,	this	scenario	prevents	
global	warming	from	exceeding	1°C	above	the	global	tempera-
ture	 in	 2000,	 a	 level	 that	Hansen	 [2004,	 2005a,b]	 has	 argued	
would	constitute	 “dangerous	 anthropogenic	 interference”	with	
global	climate.
	 O’Niell and Oppenheimer	[2002]	suggest	2°C	added	global	
warming as a limit defining “dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence”.	Thus	we	also	made	climate	simulations	for	a	scenario	ex-
pected	to	approach	but	not	exceed	that	limit.	The	“2°C”	scenario	
has	CO2	peak	at	560	ppm	in	2100	and	other	greenhouse	gases	
follow the IPCC midrange scenario A1B (see www.giss.nasa.
gov/data/simodel/ghgases/).
4.	 Climate	Simulations
	 Simulations	 for	 the	 historical	 period,	 1880-2003,	warrant	
careful	comparison	with	observations	and	analysis	of	effects	of	
individual	 forcings.	Results	are	described	 in	detail	by	Hansen 
et al.	[2006b]	and	model	diagnostics	are	available	at	data.giss.
nasa.gov/modelE/transient. We briefly summarize results rele-
vant	to	analysis	of	the	level	of	future	global	warming	that	might	
constitute	dangerous	climate	interference.
	 The	model	driven	by	the	forcings	of	Figure	1	simulates	ob-
served	1880-2003	global	 temperature	change	 reasonably	well,	
as crudely apparent in Figure 3a. An equally good fit to obser-
vations	 probably	 could	 be	 obtained	 from	 a	model	with	 larger	
sensitivity (than 2.9°C for doubled CO2) and smaller net forcing, or	a	model	with	smaller	sensitivity	and	larger	forcing,	but	pa-
leoclimate	evidence	constrains	climate	sensitivity,	as	mentioned	
Figure	3.	Global	mean	surface	air	temperature	for	several	scenarios	calculated	by	our	coupled	climate	model	
as	extensions	of	the	1880-2003	simulations	for	“all	forcings”.	Forcings	beyond	2003	for	these	scenarios	are	
defined in Figure 2. Stratospheric aerosols in 2010-2100 are the same as in 1910-2000 for the case including 
future	volcanoes.	Tropospheric	aerosols	are	unchanging	in	the	21st	century.
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above.	 Also	 our	 model	 responds	 realistically	 to	 the	 known	
short-term	forcing	by	Pinatubo	volcanic	aerosols	[Hansen et al.,	
2006b],	and	simulated	global	warming	for	the	past	few	decades,	
when	 increasing	 greenhouse	 gases	were	 the	 dominant	 forcing	
(Figure 1), is realistic [Hansen et al.,	2005b,	2006b].
	 The	 largest	 discrepancies	 in	 simulated	1880-2003	 surface	
temperature change are deficient warming in Eurasia and ex-
cessive warming of the tropical Pacific Ocean. Hansen et al.	
[2006b] present evidence that the deficient Eurasian warming 
may	be	due	to	an	excessive	anthropogenic	aerosol	optical	depth	
in	that	region.	The	lack	of	notable	observed	warming	in	the	trop-
ical Pacific could be due to increased frequency or intensity of 
La	Ninas	 [Cane et al.,	1997],	a	characteristic	 that	our	present	
model	would	not	be	able	to	capture	regardless	of	whether	it	was	
a	forced	or	unforced	change.
	 Overall,	 simulated	 climate	 change	 does	 not	 agree	 in	 all	
details	with	 observations,	 but	 such	 agreement	 is	 not	 expected	
given	unforced	climate	variability,	uncertainty	in	climate	forc-
ings,	and	current	model	limitations.	However,	the	climate	model	
does	a	good	job	of	simulating	global	temperature	change	from	
short time-scale (volcanic aerosol) to century time-scale forc-
ings.	This	provides	incentive	to	examine	model	results	for	evi-
dence	of	dangerous	human-made	climate	effects	and	to	investi-
gate	how	these	effects	depend	upon	alternative	climate	forcing	
scenarios.
4.1.	Global	Temperature	Change
	 We	carry	out	climate	simulations	for	the	21st	century	and	be-
yond	for	IPCC	[2001]	scenarios	A2,	A1B,	and	B1	and	the	“alter-
native”	and	“2°C”	scenarios	of	Hansen et al.	[2000]	and	Hansen 
and Sato	[2004].	Simulations	are	continued	beyond	2100	with	
forcings fixed at 2100 levels as requested by IPCC, although the 
alternative	and	2°C	scenarios	per	se	have	a	slow	decline	of	hu-
man-made	forcings	after	2100.
	 Figure	3a	and	Table	1	show	the	simulated	global	mean	sur-
face	 air	 temperature	 change.	 The	A2	 and	 B1	 simulations	 are	
single	runs,	while	A1B	is	a	5-member	ensemble.	A	5-member	
ensemble	of	runs	is	carried	out	for	 the	alternative	scenario	in-
cluding	future	volcanoes,	the	2010-2100	volcanic	aerosols	being	
identical	to	those	of	1910-2000	in	the	updated	Sato et al.	[1993]	
index.	Single	runs	are	made	for	the	alternative	and	2°C	scenarios	
without	future	volcanoes.
	 Global	warming	 is	0.80°C	between	2000	and	2100	 in	 the	
alternative scenario (for the 25-year running mean at 2100; it is 
0.66°C based on linear fit) and 0.89°C between 2000 and 2200 
(0.77°C based on linear fit) with atmospheric composition fixed 
after	2100.	The	Earth	is	out	of	energy	balance	by	~	¾	W/m2	in	
2100 (~0.4 W/m2 in 2200) in this scenario (Figure 3b), so global 
warming	eventually	would	exceed	1°C	if	atmospheric	compo-
sition remained fixed indefinitely. The alternative scenario of 
Hansen and Sato	[2004]	has	GHGs	decrease	slowly	after	2100,	
thus	keeping	warming	<	1°C.	Global	warming	in	all	other	sce-
narios	already	exceeds	1°C	by	2100,	ranging	from	1.2°C	in	sce-
nario	B1	to	2.7°C	in	scenario	A2.
	 Note	 the	 slow	 decline	 of	 the	 planetary	 energy	 imbalance	
after 2100 (Figure 3b), which reflects the shape of the surface 
temperature	response	to	a	climate	forcing.	Figure	4d	in	Efficacy	
[2005]	shows	that	50%	of	the	equilibrium	response	is	achieved	
within 25 years, but only 75% after 150 years, and the final 25% 
requires	several	centuries.	This	behavior	of	the	coupled	model	
occurs	because	the	deep	ocean	continues	to	take	up	heat	for	cen-
turies. Verification of this behavior in the real world requires 
data	on	deep	ocean	temperature	change.	In	the	model,	heat	stor-
age	associated	with	this	long	tail	of	the	response	curve	occurs	
mainly	in	the	Southern	Ocean.	Measured	ocean	heat	storage	in	
the	past	decade	[Willis et al.,	2004;	Lyman et al.,	2006]	presents	
limited	evidence	of	this	phenomenon,	but	the	record	is	too	short	
and the measurements too shallow for confirmation. Ongoing 
simulations	with	modelE	coupled	to	the	current	version	of	the	
Bleck	[2002]	ocean	model	do	not	show	such	deep	mixing	of	heat	
anomalies,	at	least	not	so	rapidly.
	 Figure	3c	compares	 the	global	distribution	of	21st	century	
temperature change in the five scenarios. Warming in the al-
ternative	scenario	is	<	1°C	in	most	regions,	reaching	1°C	only	
in	the	Arctic	and	a	few	continental	regions.	The	weakest	IPCC	
forcing,	 B1,	 has	 almost	 twice	 the	 warming	 of	 the	 alternative	
scenario,	with	more	than	2°C	in	the	Arctic.	The	strongest	IPCC	
forcing,	A2,	yields	four	times	the	global	warming	of	the	alter-
native	scenario,	with	annual	warming	exceeding	4°C	on	 large	
areas	of	land	and	in	the	Arctic.	We	compare	these	warmings	to	
observed	change	and	interannual	variability	in	the	next	section.
4.2.	Regional	Climate	Change
	 Figure	4	compares	climate	change	simulated	for	the	present	
century	with	climate	change	and	climate	variability	that	humans	
and	the	environment	experienced	in	the	past	century.	Figure	4a	
is the observed change (based on linear trend) of seasonal (win-
ter and summer) surface temperature over the past century and 
the	 local	 standard	deviation,	σ,	of	 seasonal	mean	 temperature	
about	its	100-year	mean.	The	range	within	which	seasonal-mean	
temperature	 has	 varied	 in	 the	 past	millennium	 is	 probably	 no	
more	than	twice	the	range	shown	in	Figure	4a	for	the	past	cen-
Table	1.	Forcings	and	Surface	Air	Temperature	Response	to	Different	Forcings	for	Several	Peri-
ods	in	the	Future
Forcing	Agent Run	Name Fi Fa ΔTs	[2000	to	Year	Below]
2000-2100 2050 2100 2200 2300
IPCC Scenarios
	A2 E3IP_A2 6.67 6.23 1.06 2.71 3.33 3.70
	A1B E3IP_A1B 4.72 4.36 1.04 1.99 2.51 2.75
	B1 E3IP_B1 2.61 2.38 0.73 1.20 1.36 1.54
GISS Scenarios
	Alternative	S.	w/o	Volcanoes E3ALT 1.59 1.44 0.50 0.80 0.89 —
	Alternative	S.	with	Volcanoes E3ALTV — — 0.53 0.56 — —
	2°C	Scenario	w/o	Volcanoes E3_2Cx 3.08 2.85 0.81 1.46 1.66 —
Constant Scenario
	2003	Forcings E3Af8xa 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.28 — —
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tury	[Mann et al.,	2003].
	 Figure	 4b	 shows	 the	 simulated	 change	 of	 seasonal	mean	
temperature	this	century	and	the	ratio	of	this	change	to	observed	
local	temperature	variability.	Warming	in	the	alternative	scenar-
io	is	typically	2σ	or	less,	i.e.,	the	average	seasonal	mean	tem-
perature	at	the	end	of	the	21st	century	will	be	at	a	level	that	is	oc-
casionally	experienced	in	today’s	climate.	Warming	in	the	2°C	
and	IPCC	B1	scenarios	 is	 typically	4σ.	Warming	in	 the	IPCC	
A2	 and	A1B	 scenarios,	 commonly	 called	 “business-as-usual”	
(BAU) scenarios, is typically 5-10σ.
	 Ecosystems,	wildlife,	 and	 humans	would	 be	 subjected	 in	
the	BAU	 scenarios	 to	 conditions	 far	 outside	 their	 local	 range	
of	experience.	We	suggest	that	5-10σ	changes	of	seasonal	tem-
perature	are	prima facie	evidence	that	the	BAU	scenarios	extend	
well	into	the	range	of	“dangerous	anthropogenic	interference”.	
Figure	 4	 provides	 a	 general	 perspective	 on	 the	magnitude	 of	
regional	 climate	 change	 expected	 for	 a	 given	 climate	 forcing	
scenario. Additional perspective on the practical significance of 
Figure	4. (a) Observed seasonal (DJF and JJA) surface temperature change in the past century based on local 
linear trends and the standard deviation about the local 100-year mean temperature, (b) simulated 21st	century	
seasonal temperature change for five GHG scenarios and the ratio of the simulated change to the observed 
20th	century	standard	deviation.
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regional climate change is obtained by considering three specific 
cases: the Arctic, tropical storms originating in the Tropical At-
lantic	Ocean,	and	the	ocean	in	the	vicinity	of	ice	shelves.
	 4.2.1.	Arctic	climate	change.	Recent	warming	in	the	Arctic	
is	having	notable	effects	on	regional	ecology,	wildlife,	and	in-
digenous	peoples	[ACIA,	2004].	Unforced	climate	variability	is	
especially large in the Arctic (Figure 4, top row), where modeled 
variability is similar in magnitude to observed variability (Fig-
ure	11	in	Hansen et al., 2006b). Observed variability includes 
the	effect	of	forcings,	but,	at	least	in	the	model,	forcings	are	not	
yet	large	enough	to	have	noticeable	effect	on	the	regional	stan-
dard	deviation	about	the	long-term	trend.	Prior	to	recent	warm-
ing, the largest fluctuation of Arctic temperature was the brief 
strong	Arctic	warming	around	1940,	which	Johannessen et al.	
[2004]	and	Delworth and Knutson	[2000]	argue	was	an	unforced	
fluctuation associated with the Arctic Oscillation and a resulting 
positive anomaly of ocean heat inflow into that region. Forcings 
such	 as	 solar	 variability	 [Lean and Rind,	 1998]	 or	 volcanoes	
[Overpeck et al.,	1997]	may	contribute	to	Arctic	variability,	but	
we do not expect details of observed climate change in the first 
half	of	the	20th	century	to	be	matched	by	model	simulations	be-
cause	of	the	large	unforced	variability.	However,	the	magnitude	
of	simulated	Arctic	warming	over	the	entire	century	[illustrated	
by	Hansen et al.,	2006b]	is	consistent	with	observations.	Given	
the	attribution	of	at	least	a	large	part	of	global	warming	to	hu-
man-made	forcings	[IPCC, 2001], high latitude amplification of 
warming	 in	 climate	models	 and	 paleoclimate	 studies,	 and	 the	
practical	 impacts	 of	 observed	 climate	 change	 [ACIA,	 2004],	
Arctic	climate	change	warrants	special	attention.
	 Early	energy	balance	climate	models	revealed	a	“small	ice	
cap	instability”	at	the	pole	[Budyko,	1969;	North,	1984],	which	
implied	that,	once	sea	ice	retreated	to	a	critical	latitude,	all	re-
maining	 ice	would	 be	 lost	 rapidly	without	 additional	 forcing.	
This	 instability	 disappears	 in	 climate	models	 with	 a	 seasonal	
cycle	of	radiation	and	realistic	dynamical	energy	transports,	but	
a vestige remains: the snow/ice albedo feedback makes sea ice 
cover	in	summer	and	fall	sensitive	to	moderate	increase	of	cli-
mate	forcings.	The	Arctic	was	ice-free	in	the	warm	season	dur-
ing	the	Middle	Pliocene	when	global	 temperature	was	only	2-
3ºC	warmer	than	today	[Crowley,	1996;	Dowsett et al.,	1996].
	 Satellite	data	indicate	a	rapid	decline,	~9%/decade,	 in	pe-
rennial	Arctic	 sea	 ice	 since	 1978	 [Comiso,	 2002],	 raising	 the	
question	 of	 whether	 the	Arctic	 has	 reached	 a	 ‘tipping	 point’	
leading	 inevitably	 to	 loss	of	all	warm	season	sea	 ice	 [Lindsay 
and Zhang,	2005].	Indeed,	some	experts	suggest	 that	“…there	
seem	to	be	few,	if	any,	processes	or	feedbacks	that	are	capable	of	
altering	the	trajectory	toward	this	‘super	interglacial’	state”	free	
of	summer	sea	ice	[Overpeck et al.,	2005].
	 Could	 the	Greenland	 ice	 sheet	 survive	 if	 the	Arctic	were	
ice-free	 in	 summer	 and	 fall?	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 not	 only	
is	ice	sheet	survival	unlikely,	but	its	disintegration	would	be	a	
wet	process	that	can	proceed	rapidly	[Hansen,	2004,	2005a,b].	
Thus	an	ice-free	Arctic	Ocean,	because	it	may	hasten	melting	of	
Greenland,	may	have	implications	for	global	sea	level,	as	well	
as	the	regional	environment,	making	Arctic	climate	change	cen-
trally relevant to definition of dangerous human interference.
	 Are	 there	 realistic	scenarios	 that	might	avoid	 large	Arctic	
warming	 and	 an	 ice-free	 Arctic	 Ocean?	 Efficacy	 [2005]	 and	
Shindell et al.	 [2006]	 suggest	 that	 non-CO2	 forcings	 are	 the	cause	of	a	substantial	portion	of	Arctic	climate	change,	and	thus	
reduction	of	these	pollutants	would	make	stabilization	of	Arctic	
climate	more	feasible.	Investigation	of	this	topic	should	include	
simulations	of	future	climate	for	plausible	changes	of	forcings	
that	affect	the	Arctic.	Although	that	is	beyond	the	scope	of	our	
present	paper,	we	can	make	research	suggestions	on	the	basis	of	
simulations	that	we	have	done	for	1880-2003.
	 The	 top	 row	of	Figure	 5	 shows	observed	1880-2003	 sur-
face	temperature	change	and	our	simulated	temperature	change	
for	‘all	forcings’,	in	both	cases	the	Arctic	warming	being	about	
twice	 the	 global	warming.	The	 second	 row	 shows	 the	 results	
of	 simulations	 including	 only	 the	CO2 forcing (left) and only CH4	plus	tropospheric	O3 (right). CO2	and	CH4	+	O3	yield	com-parable	global	and	Arctic	warmings.	The	sum	of	the	responses	
to	CO2	and	CH4	+	O3	exceeds	either	observed	warming	or	the	simulated	warming	for	‘all	forcings’,	because	the	real	world	and	
‘all	forcings’	include	negative	forcings,	which	are	due	primarily	
to	aerosols.
	 The	lower	left	of	Figure	5	shows	the	simulated	temperature	
change	due	to	the	effect	of	black	carbon	on	snow	albedo.	In	this	
simulation,	described	in	detail	by	Hansen et al.	[2006b],	a	mod-
erate snow albedo forcing (~0.05 W/m2) is assumed. The BC 
producing	 this	 snow	albedo	effect	also	has	direct	and	 indirect	
aerosol	 forcings,	 and	 the	 sources	 producing	BC	 also	 produce	
OC.	The	lower	right	of	Figure	5	shows	the	simulated	tempera-
ture	change	due	to	 the	combination	of	CH4	+	O3	+	BC	+	OC,	including	aerosol	direct	and	indirect	forcings	and	the	snow	al-
bedo	effect.	The	global	warming	is	about	the	same	as	that	due	to	
CH4	+	O3,	as	the	warming	by	BC	and	its	snow	albedo	effect	is	not	much	larger	than	the	cooling	by	OC	and	the	indirect	effect	
of	BC	and	OC.	Nevertheless,	simulated	Arctic	warming	is	more	
than	1°C	with	all	of	these	forcings	present.
	 If	CO2	growth	in	the	21st	century	is	kept	as	small	as	in	the	
Figure	 5.	 Surface	 temperature	 change	 based	 on	 local	 linear	
trends	for	observations	and	for	simulations	that	employ	differ-
ent	combinations	of	transient	1880-2003	forcings.	CH4	forcing	includes	 its	 indirect	effect	on	stratospheric	H2O.	Snow	albedo	effect	 has	 1880-2003	Fa	 ~	 0.05	W/m2.	Results	 in	 lower	 right	
include direct effects of black carbon (BC) and organic carbon 
(OC) aerosols from fossil fuels and biomass, their aerosol indi-
rect effects (AIE), and the snow albedo effect.
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alternative	 scenario,	 additional	Arctic	 warming	 is	 only	 ~1°C	
(Figure 3c). Thus, in that case, reduction of some of the pollut-
ants	considered	in	Figure	5	may	make	it	possible	to	keep	further	
Arctic	warming	under	1°C	and	thus	probably	avoid	loss	of	all	
sea	ice.	On	the	other	hand,	if	CO2	growth	follows	a	BAU	sce-nario,	the	impact	of	reducing	the	non-CO2	forcings	will	be	small	by	comparison	and	probably	inconsequential.
	 We	 suggest	 that	 the	 conclusion	 that	 a	 ‘tipping	 point’	 has	
been	passed,	such	that	it	is	not	possible	to	avoid	a	warm-season	
ice-free	Arctic,	with	all	that	might	entail	for	regional	climate	and	
the	Greenland	ice	sheet,	is	not	warranted	yet.	Better	information	
is	needed	on	the	present	magnitude	of	all	anthropogenic	forcings	
and	on	the	potential	for	 their	reduction.	If	CO2	growth	is	kept	close	to	that	of	the	alternative	scenario,	and	if	strong	efforts	are	
made	to	reduce	positive	non-CO2	forcings,	it	may	be	possible	to	minimize	further	Arctic	climate	change.
	 4.2.2.	Tropical	climate	change.	The	tropical	Atlantic	Ocean	
is	the	spawning	grounds	for	tropical	storms	and	hurricanes	that	
strike	the	United	States	and	Caribbean	nations.	Many	local	and	
large-scale	 factors	 affect	 storm	activity	 and	 there	 are	 substan-
tial	correlations	of	storm	occurrence	and	severity	with	external	
conditions	such	as	the	Southern	Oscillation	and	Quasi-Biennial	
Oscillation	[Gray,	1984;	Emanuel,	1987;	Henderson-Sellers et 
al.,	1998;	Goldenberg, et al.,	2001;	Trenberth,	2005].	Two	fac-
tors	especially	important	for	Atlantic	hurricane	activity	are	SST	
at 10-20ºN, the main development region (MDR) for Atlantic 
tropical	 storms	 [Goldenberg, et al.,	2001],	and	 the	absence	of	
strong	vertical	wind	shear	that	would	inhibit	cyclone	formation.	
In	addition,	SST	and	ocean	temperature	to	a	few	hundred	meters	
depth	along	 the	hurricane	 track	play	a	 role	 in	 storm	 intensity,	
because	warm	waters	enhance	the	potential	for	 the	moist	con-
vection	that	fuels	the	storm,	while	cooler	waters	at	depth	stirred	
up	by	the	storm	can	dampen	its	intensity.
	 Some	measures	of	Atlantic	hurricane	intensity	and	duration	
increased	in	recent	years,	raising	concern	that	global	warming	
may	be	a	factor	in	this	trend	[Bell et al.,	2005;	Webster et al.,	
2005,	Emanuel,	 2005].	 However,	Gray	 [2005]	 and	 the	 direc-
tor	 of	 the	United	States	National	Hurricane	Center	 [Mayfield,	
2005],	while	acknowledging	a	connection	between	ocean	tem-
perature	and	hurricanes,	reject	the	suggestion	that	global	warm-
ing	has	contributed	to	 the	recent	storm	upsurge,	citing	 instead	
natural	 cycles	 of	 Atlantic	 Ocean	 temperature.	 Indeed,	 multi-
decadal	variations	of	Atlantic	Ocean	temperatures	are	found	in	
instrumental	data	[Kushnir,	1994],	 in	paleoclimate	proxy	tem-
peratures	[Mann et al.,	1998],	and	in	coupled	atmosphere-ocean	
climate	 simulations	 without	 external	 forcing	 [Delworth and 
Mann,	2000].	However,	Mann and Emanuel	 [2006]	argue	that	
SST fluctuations in the MDR associated with the Atlantic Multi-
decadal	Oscillation	are	statistical	artifacts,	and	 that	practically	
all	SST	variability	in	the	region	can	be	attributed	to	competing	
trends	in	greenhouse	gases	and	aerosols.
	 Climate	 forcings	 also	 contribute	 to	 ocean	 temperature	
change,	 so	 it	 is	 of	 interest	 to	 compare	 modeled	 temperature	
change	due	to	forcings	with	observed	temperature	change	in	re-
gions	and	season	relevant	to	tropical	storms.	Bell et al.	[2005]	
define an Accumulated Cyclone Energy (ACE) index that ac-
counts	for	the	combined	strength	and	duration	of	tropical	storms	
of	hurricanes	originating	in	the	Atlantic	Ocean.	This	index	[Fig.	
4.5	of	Bell et al.,	2005]	was	generally	 low	during	1970-1994.	
For	the	past	decade	the	ACE	index	has	been	a	factor	2.4	higher	
than	 in	 1970-1994.	 Perhaps	 not	 coincidentally,	 the	 index	 had	
peaks	near	1980	and	1990,	when	global	 temperature	 also	had	
peaks,	and	the	index	was	low	during	the	few	years	affected	by	
the	1991	Pinatubo	global	cooling.	The	past	decade,	when	ACE	is	
highest,	is	the	warmest	time	in	the	past	century	and	a	period	with	
rapid	uptake	of	heat	by	the	ocean	[Levitus et al.,	2005;	Willis et 
al.,	2004;	Hansen et al.,	2005b;	Lyman et al.,	2006].
	 Figure	6a	shows	SST	anomalies	in	1995-2005,	the	time	of	
high	hurricane	 intensity,	 relative	 to	 1970-1994,	when	Atlantic	
Ocean	and	Gulf	of	Mexico	hurricanes	were	weaker.	Observa-
tions	have	warming	~0.2ºC	in	the	Gulf	of	Mexico	and	~0.45ºC	
in	 the	MDR.	The	ensemble	mean	of	 the	simulation	with	stan-
dard	“all	forcings”	has	warming	about	0.35ºC	in	both	regions,	
suggesting	 that	much,	 perhaps	most,	 of	 observed	warming	 in	
these	critical	regions	is	due	to	the	forcings	that	drive	the	climate	
model.	Increasing	GHGs,	the	principal	forcing	driving	the	mod-
el toward warming (Figure 1), are known accurately, but other 
forcings	have	large	uncertainties.	Thus	we	performed	additional	
simulations	 in	which	 the	most	uncertain	 forcings	were	altered	
to	test	the	effect	of	uncertainties	and	to	provide	more	fodder	for	
examining statistical significance.
 The lower three rows in Figure 6a (and 6c) show results 
for	 three	5-member	ensembles	of	model	runs	with	altered	tro-
pospheric	aerosol	and	solar	 forcings,	as	described	 in	detail	by	
Hansen et al.	[2006b].	In	AltAer1	anthropogenic	sulfate	aerosols	
have	the	identical	time	dependence	as	in	the	standard	experiment	
(Figure 1) but the anthropogenic increase is reduced by 50%. 
AltAer2	adds	to	AltAer1	a	doubling	of	the	temporal	increase	of	
biomass	burning	aerosols.	AltSol	 replaces	 the	 solar	 irradiance	
history	of	Lean	[2000],	which	includes	both	long-term	and	solar	
cycle	variations,	with	the	time	series	of	Lean et al.	[2002],	which	
retains	only	the	solar	change	due	to	the	11-year	Schwabe	cycle.	
These	alternative	forcings	all	yield	ensemble-mean	SST	warm-
ings	in	the	MDR	comparable	to	that	with	standard	forcings.
	 Figure	6b	shows	the	1995-2005	temperature	anomalies	 in	
the five individual runs with “all forcings”, each of which yields 
warming	in	both	the	Gulf	of	Mexico	and	the	MDR.	Figure	6c	
shows	 the	 standard	 deviations	σ*	 among	 successive	 10-year	
periods	relative	 to	 the	preceding	25	years	within	 the	available	
relevant period of record (1900-1994). As expected, the model 
has	too	little	variability	at	low	latitudes,	but	it	is	more	realistic	
at middle and high latitudes (the small ‘observed’ SST variabil-
ity at the highest latitudes is an artificial result of specifying a 
fixed SST if any sea ice is present). σ*	is	~0.15ºC	in	the	Gulf	of	
Mexico	in	observations	and	model.	Observed	σ*	is	~0.25ºC	in	
the	MDR,	but	only	about	half	that	large	in	the	model.
	 In	summary,	the	warming	in	the	model	in	recent	decades	is	
due	to	the	assumed	forcings,	and	Hansen et al.	[2006b]	present	
evidence	 that	 the	magnitude	 of	 the	model’s	 response	 to	 forc-
ings	is	realistic	on	time	scales	from	that	for	individual	volcanic	
eruptions	 to	 multidecadal	 GHG	 increases.	 The	 period	 1970-
2005	 under	 discussion	 with	 regard	 to	 hurricanes	 is	 the	 time	
when	forcings	are	known	most	accurately,	and	during	that	pe-
riod	anthropogenic	GHGs	were	the	dominant	forcing.	Although	
unforced fluctuations undoubtedly contribute to Atlantic Ocean 
temperature	change,	the	expected	GHG	warming	is	comparable	
in magnitude to observed warming and must be at least a signifi-
cant	contributor	to	that	warming.
 We conclude that the definitive assertion of Gray	 [2005]	
and	Mayfield	[2005],	that	human-made	GHGs	play	no	role	in	the	
Atlantic	Ocean	temperature	changes	that	 they	assume	to	drive	
hurricane intensification, is untenable. Specifically, the asser-
tions that (1) hurricane intensification of the past decade is due 
to changes in SST in the Atlantic Ocean, and (2) global warming 
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cannot have had a significant role in the hurricane intensification 
of	the	past	decade,	are	mutually	inconsistent.	On	the	contrary,	
although	 natural	 cycles	 play	 a	 role	 in	 changing	Atlantic	 SST,	
our	model	results	indicate	that,	to	the	degree	that	hurricane	in-
tensification of the past decade is a product of increasing SST in 
the	Atlantic	Ocean	and	the	Gulf	of	Mexico,	human-made	GHGs	
probably	 are	 a	 substantial	 contributor,	 as	 also	 concluded	 by	
Mann	and	Emanuel	[2006].	Santer et al.	[2006]	have	obtained	
similar	conclusions	by	examining	the	results	of	22	climate	mod-
els.
	 Figure	6d	shows	 the	additional	SST	warming	during	hur-
ricane	season	by	mid-century	in	the	three	IPCC,	alternative,	and	
2ºC	scenarios,	relative	to	the	present.	SST	is	only	one	of	the	en-
vironmental	factors	that	affect	hurricanes,	but	there	is	theoreti-
cal	 [Emanuel,	 1987]	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 [Emanuel,	 2005;	
Webster et al.,	2005]	 that	higher	SST	contributes	 to	 increased	
maximum	strength	of	 tropical	cyclones.	The	salient	point	 that	
we	note	in	Figure	6d	is	that,	despite	the	fact	that	warming	“in	
the	pipeline”	in	2004	is	the	same	for	all	scenarios,	the	alterna-
tive	scenario	already	at	mid-century	has	notably	less	warming	
than	the	other	scenarios.	This	result	refutes	the	common	state-
ment	that	constraining	climate	forcings	has	a	negligible	effect	on	
expected	warming	this	century.	Divergence	of	warming	among	
the	scenarios	is	even	greater	in	later	decades,	as	the	growth	of	
climate	forcing	declines	rapidly	in	the	alternative	scenario.
	 4.2.3.	Ice	sheet	and	methane	hydrate	stabilities.	Perhaps	
the	greatest	threat	of	catastrophic	climate	impacts	for	humans	is	
the	possibility	that	warming	may	cause	one	or	more	of	the	ice	
sheets	to	become	unstable,	initiating	a	process	of	disintegration	
that	is	out	of	humanity’s	control.	We	focus	on	ice	sheet	stability,	
because	of	the	potential	for	sea	level	change	this	century.	How-
ever,	ice	sheets	are	related	to	the	stability	of	methane	hydrates	in	
permafrost	and	in	marine	sediments,	because	ice	sheet	disinte-
gration	and	methane	release	are	both	affected	by	surface	warm-
ing	at	high	 latitudes	and	by	ocean	warming	at	 the	depths	 that	
affect	ice	shelves	and	shallow	methane	hydrate	deposits.	Also,	
a	 substantial	 positive	 climate	 feedback	 from	methane	 release	
could make it difficult to achieve the relatively benign alterna-
tive	scenario,	thus	affecting	the	ice	sheet	stability	issue	as	well	
as	other	climate	impacts.	Most	methane	hydrates	in	marine	sedi-
Figure	6. (a) 1995-2005 Aug-Oct SST anomalies relative to 1970-1994 base period, the top map for obser-
vations and next four for several ‘all forcing’ ensembles, (b) 1995-2005 Aug-Oct SST anomalies relative to 
1970-1994 for individual ensemble members of the standard ‘all forcings’ simulation, (c) standard deviations 
among successive decadal means relative to immediately preceding 25 years, (d) simulated 2045-2055 Aug-
Oct SST anomalies relative to the present (2001-2009 mean). 
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ments are at depths beneath the ocean floor that would require 
centuries	for	destabilization	[Kvenvolden and Lorenson,	2001;	
Archer,	 2006],	 but	 the	 anthropogenic	 thermal	 burst	 in	 ocean	
temperatures	is	likely	to	persist	for	centuries.	Furthermore,	the	
methane in shallow sediments, i.e., at or near the sea floor, might 
begin	 to	yield	a	positive	climate	 feedback	 this	century	 if	 sub-
stantial	warm	thermal	anomalies	penetrate	to	the	ocean	bottom.
	 The	 Greenland	 and	 Antarctic	 ice	 sheets	 contain	 enough	
water	 to	raise	sea	 level	about	70	m,	with	Greenland	and	West	
Antarctica	each	containing	about	10%	of	the	total	and	East	Ant-
arctica	 holding	 the	 remaining	 80%.	 IPCC	 [2001]	 central	 esti-
mates	for	sea	level	change	in	the	21st	century	include	negligible	
contributions	from	Greenland	and	Antarctica,	as	they	presume	
that	melting	of	ice	sheet	fringes	will	be	largely	balanced	by	ice	
sheet	growth	in	interior	regions	where	snowfall	increases.
	 However,	Earth’s	history	shows	that	the	long-term	response	
to	global	warming	 includes	 substantial	melting	of	 ice	and	 sea	
level	rise.	During	the	penultimate	interglacial	period,	~130,000	
years	ago,	when	global	temperature	may	have	been	as	much	as	
~1°C	warmer	 than	 in	 the	present	 interglacial	period,	 sea	 level	
was	 4	 ±	 2	m	 higher	 than	 today	 [McCulloch and Esat,	 2000;	
Thompson and Goldstein,	2005],	demonstrating	that	today’s	sea	
level	is	not	particularly	favored.	However,	changes	of	sea	level	
and	global	temperature	among	recent	interglacial	periods	are	not	
large	compared	to	the	uncertainties,	and	ice	sheet	stability	is	af-
fected	not	only	by	global	temperature	but	also	by	the	geographi-
cal	and	season	distribution	of	solar	irradiance,	which	differ	from	
one interglacial period to another. Therefore, it is difficult to use 
the	last	interglacial	period	as	a	measure	of	the	sensitivity	of	sea	
level	 to	global	 temperature.	The	most	 recent	 time	with	global	
temperature ~3°C greater than today (during the Pliocene, ~ 3 
million years ago) had sea level 25 ± 10 m higher than today 
[Barrett et al.,	1992;	Dowsett et al.	1994;	Dwyer et al.,	1995],	
suggesting	that,	given	enough	time,	a	BAU	level	of	global	warm-
ing	could	yield	huge	sea	level	change.	A	principal	issue	is	thus	
the	response	time	of	ice	sheets	to	global	warming.
	 It	is	commonly	assumed,	perhaps	because	of	the	time	scale	
of	 the	 ice	ages,	 that	 the	 response	 time	of	 ice	sheets	 is	millen-
nia.	Indeed,	ice	sheet	models	designed	to	interpret	slow	paleo-
climate	 changes	 respond	 lethargically,	 i.e.,	 on	millennial	 time	
scales. However, perceived paleoclimate change may reflect 
more	the	time	scale	for	changes	of	forcing,	rather	than	an	inher-
ent	ice	sheet	response	time.	Ice	sheet	models	used	for	paleocli-
mate	 studies	 generally	 do	 not	 incorporate	 all	 the	 physics	 that	
may	be	critical	for	 the	wet	process	of	 ice	sheet	disintegration,	
e.g., modeling of the ice streams that channel flow of continental 
ice	 to	 the	ocean,	 including	effects	of	melt	percolation	 through	
crevasses	and	moulins,	removal	of	ice	shelves	by	the	warming	
ocean,	and	dynamical	propagation	inland	of	the	thinning	and	re-
treat	of	coastal	ice.	Hansen	[2005a,b]	argues	that,	for	a	forcing	
as	 large	 as	 that	 in	BAU	climate	 forcing	 scenarios,	 a	 large	 ice	
sheet	response	would	likely	occur	within	centuries,	and	ice	melt	
this	century	could	yield	sea	level	rise	of	1	m	or	more	and	a	dy-
namically	changing	ice	sheet	that	is	out	of	our	control.
	 Two	 regional	 climate	 changes	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 ice	
sheet response time are: (1) surface melt on the ice sheets, and 
(2) melt of submarine ice shelves that buttress glaciers draining 
the	ice	sheets.	Zwally et al.	[2002]	showed	that	increased	surface	
melt	on	Greenland	penetrated	ice	sheet	crevasses	and	reached	the	
ice	sheet	base,	where	it	lubricated	the	ice-bedrock	interface	and	
accelerated	ice	discharge	to	the	ocean.	Van den Broeke	 [2005]	
found	that	unusually	large	surface	melt	on	an	Antarctic	ice	shelf	
preceded and probably contributed significantly to collapse of 
the	ice	shelf.	Thinning	and	retreat	of	ice	shelves	due	to	warming	
ocean	water	works	in	concert	with	surface	melt.	Hughes	[1972,	
1981]	and	Mercer [1978] suggested that floating and grounded 
ice	shelves	extending	into	the	ocean	serve	to	buttress	outlet	gla-
ciers,	 and	 thus	 a	warming	 ocean	 that	melts	 ice	 shelves	 could	
lead to rapid ice sheet shrinkage or collapse. Confirmation of the 
effectiveness	of	 these	processes	has	been	obtained	 in	 the	past	
decade	 from	observations	 of	 increased	 surface	melt,	 ice	 shelf	
thinning	and	retreat,	and	acceleration	of	glaciers	on	the	Antarctic	
Peninsula	[De Angelis and Skvarca,	2003;	Rignot et al.,	2004;	
van den Broeke,	2005],	West	Antarctica	[Rignot,	1998;	Shepherd 
et al.,	2002,	2004;	Thomas et al.,	2004],	and	Greenland	[Abdala-
ti et al.,	2001;	Zwally et al.,	2002;	Thomas et al.,	2003],	in	some	
cases	with	 documented	 effects	 extending	 far	 inland.	Thus	we	
examine	here	both	projected	surface	warming	on	the	ice	sheets	
and	warming	of	nearby	ocean	waters.
	 Summer	 surface	 air	 temperature	 change	 on	Greenland	 in	
the	21st	century	is	only	0.5-1°C	with	alternative	scenario	climate	
forcings (Figure 4), but it is 2-4°C for the IPCC BAU scenarios 
(A2 and A1B). Simulated 21st	century	summer	warmings	in	West	
Antarctica (Figure 4) differ by a similar factor, being ~0.5°C in 
the	alternative	scenario	and	~2°C	in	the	BAU	scenarios.
	 Submarine	 ice	 shelves	 around	Antarctica	 and	 Greenland	
extend	to	ocean	depths	of	1	km	and	deeper	[Rignot and Jacobs,	
2002].	Figure	7b	shows	simulated	zonal	mean	ocean	tempera-
ture	change	versus	depth	for	the	past	century	and	the	21st	cen-
tury.	Despite	near	absence	of	surface	warming	in	the	Antarctic	
Circumpolar	Current,	warming	 of	 a	 few	 tenths	 of	 a	 degree	 is	
found	at	depths	from	a	few	hundred	to	1500	m,	consistent	with	
observations	 in	 the	past	half-century	 [Gille,	2002;	Aoki et al.,	
2003].	Modeled	warming	 is	due	 to	GHGs,	with	 less	warming	
when	all	forcings	are	included.
	 Maps	of	simulated	temperature	change	for	the	top	1360	m	
of the ocean (Figure 7a) show warming around the entire cir-
cumference	of	Greenland,	despite	cooling	in	the	North	Atlantic.	
This	warming	at	ocean	depth	differs	by	about	a	 factor	of	 two	
between	 the	alternative	and	BAU	scenarios,	 less	 than	 the	 fac-
tor	~4	difference	 in	 summer	 surface	warming	over	Greenland	
and	Antarctica,	consistent	with	the	longer	response	time	of	the	
ocean.	Although	we	cannot	easily	convert	temperature	increase	
into	rate	of	melting	and	sea	level	rise,	it	is	apparent	that	the	BAU	
scenarios	pose	much	greater	risk	of	large	sea	level	rise	than	the	
alternative	scenario,	as	discussed	in	Section	6.
	 Surface	and	submarine	temperature	change	are	also	relevant	
to	the	stability	of	methane	hydrates	in	permafrost	and	in	ocean	
sediments.	 Recent	warming	 is	 already	 beginning	 to	 cause	 re-
lease	of	methane	from	thawing	permafrost	in	Siberia	[Walter et 
al.,	2006;	Zimov et al.,	2006],	but	this	methane	release	is	not	yet	
large	enough	to	yield	an	overall	increase	of	atmospheric	CH4,	as	shown	in	section	5.	Projected	21st	century	summer	warming	in	
the	Northern	Hemisphere	permafrost	regions	is	typically	a	factor	
of five larger in BAU scenarios than in the alternative scenario 
(Figure 4), suggesting that the threat of a significant positive 
climate	feedback	is	much	greater	in	the	BAU	scenarios.
	 Methane	 hydrates	 in	 ocean	 sediments	 are	 an	 even	 larger	
potential	 source	 of	 methane	 emissions	 [Archer,	 2006].	 It	 is	
possible	 that	 much	 of	 the	 temperature	 rise	 in	 extreme	 global	
warming	events,	 such	as	 the	approximately	6°C	 that	occurred	
at	 the	Paleocene-Eocene	boundary	about	55	million	years	ago	
[Bowen et al.,	2006],	resulted	from	catastrophic	release	of	meth-
ane	from	methane	hydrates	in	ocean	sediments.	It	may	require	
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many	centuries	for	ocean	warming	to	substantially	impact	these	
methane	hydrates	[Archer,	2006].	Calculations	of	global	warm-
ing	enhancement	from	methane	hydrates	based	on	diffusive	or	
upwelling-diffusion	ocean	models	suggest	that	the	methane	hy-
drate	feedback	is	small	on	the	century	time	scale	[Harvey and 
Huang,	1995].	However,	the	positive	thermal	anomalies	that	we	
simulate	with	our	dynamic	ocean	model	at	great	ocean	depths	at	
high latitudes (Figure 7) are much larger near the ocean bottom 
than we would obtain with diffusive mixing of anomalies (as in 
our Q-flux model), suggesting that further attention to the possi-
bility	of	methane	hydrate	release	is	warranted.	With	our	present	
lack	of	understanding,	we	can	perhaps	only	say	with	reasonable	
confidence that the chance of significant methane hydrate feed-
back	is	greater	with	BAU	scenarios	than	with	the	alternative	sce-
nario,	and	that	empirical	evidence	from	prior	interglacial	periods	
suggests	that	large	methane	hydrate	release	is	unlikely	if	global	
warming	is	kept	within	the	range	of	recent	interglacial	periods.
5.	 Actual	GHG	Trends	versus	Scenarios
	 Global	 and	 regional	 climate	 changes	 simulated	 for	 IPCC	
scenarios	 in	 the	21st	 century	are	 large	 in	comparison	with	ob-
served	 climate	 variations	 in	 the	 20th	 century.	 This	 raises	 the	
question: is it plausible for global climate forcing to follow a 
path	with	a	smaller	forcing	than	those	in	the	IPCC	scenarios?
5.1.	Ambient	GHG	Amounts
	 Figure	8a	compares	GHG	scenarios	and	observations,	 the	
latter	being	an	update	of	Hansen and Sato [2004] (see www.giss.
nasa.gov/data/simodel/ghgases), who define the data sources 
and	methods	of	obtaining	global	means	from	station	measure-
ments.	Figure	8b	shows	the	corresponding	annual	growth	rates.	
Figure	8c	and	8d	compare	observed	climate	forcings	and	their	
growth	rates	with	the	IPCC,	2°C,	and	alternative	scenarios.
	 Observed	CO2	falls	close	to	all	scenarios,	which	do	not	dif-fer	much	in	early	years	of	the	21st	century.	CO2	has	large	year-to-year	variations	in	its	growth	rate	due	to	variations	in	terres-
trial	and	ocean	sinks,	as	well	as	biomass	burning	and	fossil	fuel	
sources.	However,	we	are	able	to	draw	conclusions	in	section	5.3	
about	the	realism	of	CO2	scenarios	by	comparing	emission	sce-narios	with	real	world	data	on	fossil	fuel	CO2	emission	trends,	for	which	there	are	reasonably	accurate	data.
	 Overall,	growth	rates	of	the	well-mixed	non-CO2	forcings	
fall below IPCC scenarios (Figure 8a,b). Growth of CH4	 falls	below	any	 IPCC	scenario	and	even	below	 the	alternative	sce-
nario.	Observed	N2O	falls	slightly	below	all	scenarios.	The	sum	
of MPTGs (Montreal Protocol Trace Gases) and OTGs (Other 
Trace Gases) falls between the IPCC scenarios and the alterna-
tive scenario (which was defined at a later time than the IPCC 
scenarios, when more observational data were available). The 
estimated	forcing	by	MPTGs	is	based	on	measurements	of	10	
of	these	gases,	as	delineated	by	Hansen and Sato	[2004],	all	of	
which	are	growing	more	slowly	than	in	the	IPCC	scenarios,	with	
the few significant unmeasured MPTGs assumed to follow the 
lowest	IPCC	scenario.	OTGs	with	reported	data	include	HFC-
134a	and	SF6,	for	which	measurements	are	close	to	or	slightly	below	IPCC	scenarios.
	 Figures	8c	and	8d	show	that	the	net	forcing	by	well-mixed	
GHGs	for	the	past	few	years	has	been	following	a	course	close	
to	that	of	the	alternative	scenario.	However,	it	should	not	be	as-
sumed	that	forcings	will	remain	close	to	the	alternative	scenario,	
because,	as	 shown	below,	 fossil	 fuel	CO2	emissions	now	sub-stantially	exceed	those	in	the	alternative	scenario.
 The alternative scenario was defined [Hansen et al.,	2000]	
as	 a	 potential	 goal	 under	 the	 assumption	 of	 concerted	 global	
efforts to simultaneously (1) reduce air pollution (for human 
health, climate and other reasons), and (2) stabilize CO2	emis-
sions initially and begin to achieve significant emission reduc-
tions	before	mid-century,	 such	 that	added	CO2	 forcing	 is	held	to	~1	W/m2	in	50	years	and	~1.5	W/m2	in	100	years.	Thus	the	
alternative	scenario	assumes	that	CH4	amount	will	peak	within	a	decade	and	then	decline	enough	to	balance	continued	growth	of	
Figure	7. (a) Temperature change in the top 10 layers (1360 m) of the ocean for three periods and three 
forcings, (b) zonal-mean ocean temperature change for these forcings. Positive and negative temperature 
intervals	are	symmetric	about	zero.
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N2O.	It	also	assumes	that	the	decline	of	CH4	and	other	O3	precur-sors	will	decrease	tropospheric	O3	enough	to	balance	the	small	
increase in forcing (several hundredths of a W/m2) expected due 
to	recovery	of	halogen-induced	stratospheric	O3	depletion.	 The	 most	 demanding	 requirement	 of	 the	 alternative	 sce-
nario	is	that	added	CO2	forcing	be	held	to	~1	W/m2	in	50	years	and	~1.5	W/m2	in	100	years.	The	scenario	in	our	present	climate	
simulations,	for	example,	has	annual	mean	CO2	growth	of	1.7	ppm/year	 at	 the	end	of	 the	20th	 century	declining	 to	1.3	ppm/
year	by	2050.	The	plausibility	of	 the	alternative	scenario	 thus	
depends	critically	upon	fossil	fuel	CO2	emissions.
5.2.	Fossil	Fuel	CO2	Emissions
	 Global	fossil	fuel	CO2	emissions	change	by	only	a	few	per-
cent per year and are known with sufficient accuracy that we 
can	draw	conclusions	related	to	atmospheric	CO2	trends,	despite	large	year-to-year	variability	in	atmospheric	CO2	growth.	In	re-
cent	 decades	 the	 increase	 of	 atmospheric	CO2,	 averaged	 over	several	 years,	 has	been	~58%	of	 fossil	 fuel	 emissions	 [IPCC,	
2001;	Hansen,	 2005b].	Carbon	cycle	models	 suggest	 that	 this	
‘airborne	 fraction’	of	CO2	 is	 unlikely	 to	decrease	 this	 century	if	emissions	increase,	indeed,	most	models	yield	an	increasing	
airborne	fraction	as	terrestrial	CO2	uptake	is	likely	to	decrease	[Cox et al.,	2000;	Friedlingstein, et al.,	2003;	Fung	et	al.,	2005;	
Matthews et al.,	2005;	Jones et al.,	2005].
	 We	use	the	historical	emissions	data	set	of	Marland et al.	
[2006]	supplemented	with	data	for	2004-2005	from	British Pe-
troleum	[2006].	The	data	are	imperfect,	e.g.,	the	temporary	re-
duction	of	coal	use	 in	China	 in	 the	 late	1990s	may	have	been	
exaggerated	by	reporting	problems	[Sinton,	2001],	but	effort	has	
been	made	to	make	the	data	as	temporally	consistent	as	possible	
[Marland et al.,	2006].	We	include	estimates	for	CO2	from	gas	
flaring (0.3% of CO2 emissions) and cement production (3.8% 
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Figure	8. (a) Greenhouse gas amounts, (b) growth rates, and (c) resulting forcings and (d) forcing growth 
rates	for	IPCC	 [2001],	“alternative”,	and	“2°C”	scenarios	[Hansen et al.,	2000;	Hansen and Sato,	2004].	
Observations	are	5-year	running	means	of	data	described	by	Hansen and Sato	[2004]	and	in	the	text.	Data	for	
recent	decades	are	those	reported	by	the	NOAA	Earth	System	Research	Laboratory,	Global	Monitoring	Divi-
sion (www.cmdl.noaa.gov). MPTGs and OTGs without available observations (4.9% of the MPTG + OTG 
estimated forcing in 2000) were assumed to follow IPCC scenario A1B, which probably exaggerates their 
forcing,	as	all	measured	MPTGs	and	OTGs	are	currently	falling	below	their	IPCC	scenarios.
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of emissions in 2005). We normalize British Petroleum	[2006]	
data for each fossil fuel such that it coincides with the final year 
of	Marland et al. [2006] data (2003 in present analysis).
	 Global	fossil	fuel	CO2	emissions	grew	at	>4%/year	for	most	of	the	century	preceding	1973,	but	since	1973	at	~1.7%/year	and	
for the past decade at ~2%/year (Figure 9a). Coal has produced 
50%	of	 fossil	 fuel	CO2 emissions through 2005 (oil 37%, gas 
13%), and, with the recent uptick in its use (Figure 9a), coal 
seems	poised	 to	 retake	 from	oil	 the	 role	of	 the	 largest	current	
CO2	source,	calling	into	question	the	inevitability	of	continued	decarbonization	of	global	energy	[Ausubel,	1996,	2000],	at	least	
in	the	near-term.
	 Continued	growth	of	CO2	emissions	at	1.7%/year	doubles	emissions	in	~40	years	and	is	close	to	IPCC	BAU	growth.	IPCC	
scenarios	 B1,	 A1B,	 A2	 and	 A1F1	 require	 50-year	 constant	
growth	 rates	 of	 1.1%,	 1.7%,	 1.8%	 and	 2.4%,	 respectively,	 to	
reach	their	2050	emission	rates.
	 Figure	 9b	 reveals	 near	 congruence	 of	 the	 global	 growth	
1850 1900 1950 2000
   10
  100
 1000
10000
Total
Gas
Oil
Coal
(a)  Global Fossil-Fuel CO2 Annual Emissions
Em
iss
ion
 (1
09
 kg
 of
 C
arb
on
 / y
ea
r)
4.5%/yrk m|
1.2%/yr|k m|
4.7%/yr|k m|
1.7%/yr|k m|
}} }}
(1850-1914)
(1914-45)
(1945-73)
(1973-2005)
1850 1900 1950 2000    10
   100
  1000
 10000 Global
USA
China
Russia
India
Japan
Germany
UK
RoE
RoW
(b)  Country/Region Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions
(c)  1750-2005 Accumulated Emissions
U.S.A.
27.8%
China
7.8%
Russia
7.5%
Germany
6.7%
U.K. 6.1%
Japa
n 3.9
%
Indi
a 2.
4%
Rest of
Europe
18.3%
Rest of
World
12.5%
Ships/Air4%
CanAus 3.0%
(d)  Airborne Emissions in 2005
U.S.A.
26.3%
China
9.2%
Russia
7.5%
Germany5.8%
U.K. 4.8%
Japan
 4.2%
Indi
a 2.8
%
Rest of
Europe
17.8%
Rest of
World
14.5%
Ships/Air4%
CanAus 3.1%
(e)  2005 Annual Emissions
20.5%
China
18.0%Russia
5.4%
India 4.9%
Japan 4.4%
Grm. 2.
7%
U.K. 
2.0%
Rest of
Europe
12.4%
Rest of
World
21.4%
Ships/Air5%
CanAus 3.3%
0
2
4
6
(f)  2003 Per Capita Fossil Fuel CO2 Emission Rate (103kg Carbon/year/person)
U.S.A. China Russia India Japan GermanyCanadaU. KingdomS. Korea Italy Mexico Iran France S. AfricaAustralia
Decreasing Total Emissions }}}}}}m
U.S.A.
Figure	9. Fossil fuel annual emissions in terms of (a) fuel type, and (b) source country or region. (c) is accu-
mulated 1750-2005 emissions by source region, (d) is the contribution to anthropogenic CO2	remaining	in	the	
air in 2005 based on an analytic fit to the Bern carbon cycle model, (e) is 2005 emissions, and (f) is per capita 
emissions of the 15 largest sources in 2003. Data sources: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak 
Ridge	National	Laboratory	for	1751-2003	and	British Petroleum	[2006]	for	2004-2005.	Data	for	Russia	are	
60%	of	USSR	for	1850-1991	and	Russian	Federation	thereafter.
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curve	for	CO2	emissions	with	that	for	the	United	States,	perhaps	
reflecting the fact that the United States has long been a tech-
nology leader and suggesting that it may be difficult for global 
emissions to flatten out and decline unless the United States fol-
lows	such	a	course.	However,	Figure	9b	also	 shows	 the	 rapid	
rise of emissions from China, India and ‘Rest of World’ (prin-
cipal	components	being	Southeast	Asia,	Middle	East,	Canada,	
Australia, South America, Africa), whose combined portion of 
global	emissions	is	now	48%	and	growing.	CO2	emissions	from	Europe	and	 the	Russian	Federation	have	declined	 since	1990.	
Japan	had	rapid	emissions	growth	from	1950	until	the	oil	em-
bargo and price rise of 1973, but nearly flat subsequent emis-
sions as a result of concerted efficiency efforts and growing use 
of	nuclear	power	[Okabe,	2002],	illustrating	the	compatibility	of	
strong	economic	growth	with	constrained	emissions.
	 The	rationale	for	the	alternative	scenario	is	that	a	leveling	
of	CO2	emissions	is	practical	in	the	near	term	based	on	existing	
technologies, especially via improved energy efficiencies, and 
that	reduced	long-term	emissions	could	be	achieved	via	CO2	se-questration,	renewable	energies,	improved	nuclear	power,	and/
or	new	non-fossil	energy	sources.	Pacala and Socolow	[2004]	
provide	 a	 quantitative	 discussion	 of	 several	 technologies	 that	
together provide sufficient ‘wedges’ to reduce near-term CO2	emissions	 growth	 to	 0%.	 However,	 leveling	 off	 of	 emissions	
will	not	occur	without	concerted	efforts	to	adopt	required	tech-
nologies.	In	view	of	the	growing	proportion	of	emissions	from	
developing	countries,	it	will	also	require	international	coopera-
tion	and	sharing	of	technologies.
	 Failure	 of	 current	 emission	 trends	 to	meet	 the	 alternative	
scenario can be quantified using the empirical fact that the CO2	
‘airborne fraction’ (ratio of observed atmospheric CO2	increase	to	fossil	fuel	CO2 emissions), averaged over several years, has 
remained fixed at nearly 60% for half a century. 60% of current 
fossil	fuel	emissions	yields	an	annual	airborne	CO2	increment	of	2	ppm,	which	should	thus	be	viewed	as	the	present	underlying	
growth	rate	of	atmospheric	CO2,	even	 though	actual	 increases	
fluctuate strongly from year to year. The alternative scenario 
permits	CO2 growth of 75 ppm between 2000 and 2050 (85 ppm 
for IPCC estimates of forcing per ppm) to yield a 50-year forc-
ing	of	1	W/m2,	and	it	assumes	that	this	might	be	achieved,	for	
example,	via	CO2	annual	growth	decreasing	from	the	 late	20th	century	value	of	1.7	ppm/year	to	1.3	ppm/year	by	mid-century.
	 Overshoot	of	the	1	W/m2	target	for	added	CO2	forcing	this	half-century	 can	 be	 balanced,	 in	 principle,	 by	 reducing	 non-
CO2	forcings.	However,	 the	maximum	likely	decrease	of	non-CO2	forcings	is	several	tenths	of	1	W/m2,	so	continued	2%/year	growth	of	CO2	emissions	for	even	one	more	decade	may	make	the	alternative	scenario	impractical	to	achieve.	The	action	most	
threatening	to	the	alternative	scenario	would	be	extensive	con-
struction of new coal-fired power plants without provision for 
CO2	sequestration,	because	of	 the	 long	 life	of	power	plant	 in-
frastructure. Climatic consequences of coal-fired power plants 
can be averted via coal gasification with CO2	 sequestration	[Hawkins,	2005],	but	during	the	next	10	years	that	technology	
is	only	being	 tested.	Thus	 the	 alternative	 scenario’s	near-term	
requirement	of	stabilizing	CO2	emissions	requires	emphasis	on	greater	use	of	renewable	energy	sources	and,	especially,	energy	
efficiency, which together have the potential to satisfy increased 
energy	needs	for	at	least	1-2	decades	[Romm et al.,	1998;	Pacala 
and Socolow,	2004;	NCEP,	2004].
	 Carbon	 cycle	 facts	 sketched	 in	 Figure	 10	 aid	 discussion	
of	 the	 role	of	 fossil	 fuel	CO2	 emissions	 in	determining	 future	
climate forcing, and specifically help define constraints on CO2	emissions	 that	 are	 needed	 if	 the	 alternative	 scenario	 is	 to	 be	
achieved. Figure 10 (a) shows the decay of a small pulse CO2	
emission based on a simple analytic fit to the Bern carbon cycle 
model	[Joos et al.,	1996]
	 CO2 (%) = 18 + 14 e-t/420	+	18	e	-t/70	+	24	e	-t/21	+	26	e	-t/3.4	.   (1)
In (1), t is time, and we slightly rounded coefficients calculated 
by	Joos	[Shine et al.	2005].
	 In	this	approximation	of	the	carbon	cycle,	about	one-third	
of	anthropogenic	CO2	emissions	remain	in	the	atmosphere	after	
100 years (Figure 10a) and one-fifth after 1000 years. Process-
es	not	accounted	 for	by	 the	model,	 including	burial	of	carbon	
in	ocean	sediments	 from	perturbation	of	 the	CaCO3	cycle	and	silicate	weathering,	remove	CO2	on	longer	time	scales	[Archer,	
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Figure	10.	(a) Decay of a small pulse of CO2	added	to	today’s	atmosphere,	based	on	analytic	approximation	to	the	Bern	carbon	cycle	model	[Joos et al.,	1996;	Shine et al., 2005], (b) fossil fuel emissions to date based 
on	sources	in	Figure	9,	and	proven	reserves	and	estimated	economically	recoverable	reserve	growth	based	on	
EIA	[2005]	and,	in	the	case	of	coal,	IPCC	[2001].
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2005],	but	for	practical	purposes	500-1000	years	is	“forever”,	as	
it	is	long	enough	for	ice	sheets	to	respond	and	it	is	many	human	
generations. Indeed, the function (1) should be viewed as an ap-
proximate	lower	bound	for	the	portion	of	fossil	fuel	CO2	emis-sions	 that	 remain	 airborne.	 The	 uptake	 capacity	 of	 the	 ocean	
decreases as the amount of dissolved carbon increases (the buf-
fer factor increases) and there are uncertain but potentially large 
climate	feedbacks	that	may	add	CO2	to	the	air,	e.g.,	carbon	emis-sions	from	forest	dieback	[Cox et al.,	2000],	melting	permafrost	
[Walter et al.	2006;	Zimov et al.,	2006],	and	warming	ocean	bot-
tom	[Archer,	2006].
 Integration over the period 1750-2005 of the product of (1) 
and	 fossil	 fuel	 emissions	 of	 Fig.	 9a	 yields	 a	 present	 airborne	
fossil	 fuel	 CO2	 amount	 of	 ~80	 ppm	 [Kharecha and Hansen,	2006].	The	observed	atmospheric	CO2	increase	is	~100	ppm,	the	difference	presumably	due	to	the	net	consequence	of	deforesta-
tion	and	biospheric	uptake	not	incorporated	in	the	carbon	cycle	
model,	and,	in	part,	imprecision	of	the	carbon	cycle	model.	This	
calculation	provides	a	check	on	the	reasonableness	of	 the	car-
bon cycle model approximation (1), which should continue to 
provide	useful	estimates	for	the	moderate	fossil	fuel	emissions	
inherent	in	the	alternative	scenario.	As	mentioned	above,	for	the	
greater	CO2 emissions of BAU scenarios equation (1) may begin to	substantially	underestimate	airborne	CO2,	as	it	excludes	the	nonlinearity	of	the	ocean	carbon	cycle	and	anticipated	climate	
feedbacks	on	atmospheric	CO2	and	CH4,	the	latter	being	eventu-ally	oxidized	to	CO2.	 Figure	10b	suggests	 the	key	role	 that	coal	and	unconven-
tional fossil fuels (labeled “other”) will play in determining fu-
ture	CO2	levels	and	the	attainment	or	non-attainment	of	the	al-ternative	scenario.	If	growth	of	oil	and	gas	reserves	estimated	by	
the	Energy	Information	Administration	[EIA,	2005]	is	realistic,	
full	exploitation	of	oil	and	gas	will	 take	airborne	atmospheric	
CO2	to	~450	ppm,	assuming	that	coal	use	is	phased	out	over	the	next	 several	decades	except	 for	uses	where	 the	CO2	produced	can	be	captured	and	sequestered	[Kharecha and Hansen,	2006].	
Achievement	 of	 this	CO2	 limit	 also	 requires	 that	 the	massive	
amounts of unconventional fossil fuels (labeled ‘other’ in Fig-
ure 10) are exploited only if the resulting CO2	is	captured	and	sequestered.
6.	 Summary:	Can	We	Avoid	Dangerous	Climate	Change?
6.1.	Global	Warming:	How	Much	is	Dangerous?
	 IPCC	 [2001]	 provides	 an	 invaluable	 service	 by	 assessing	
knowledge	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 addressing	 the	 goal	 of	 the	
United	 Nations	 Framework	 Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change	
[Article	 2,	United Nations,	 1992],	which	 is	 to	 stabilize	 atmo-
spheric	 composition	 at	 a	 level	 avoiding	 ‘dangerous	 anthropo-
genic	 interference’	 with	 climate.	 IPCC	 [2001]	 discusses	 dan-
gerous	interference	with	the	aid	of	a	‘burning	embers’	diagram,	
in	which	several	‘reasons	for	concern’	are	assigned	colors	that	
become	 increasingly	 red	 as	 global	 temperature	 increases,	 the	
color	assignments	being	based	on	expert	opinions.	The	diagram	
is	sometimes	taken	as	suggesting	that	global	warming	of	2-3°C,	
relative	to	recent	temperatures,	is	likely	to	be	dangerous	[IPCC,	
2001;	Smith and Hitz,	2003;	Yohe et al.,	2004].	Schneider and 
Mastrandrea	 [2005]	 use	 the	 burning	 embers	 for	 a	 probabilis-
tic	assessment	of	dangerous,	with	2.85°C	as	the	50th	percentile	
threshold.
	 Hansen	 [2004,	 2005a,b]	 asserts	 that	 the	 dangerous	 level	
of	global	warming	is	closer	 to	1°C,	his	principal	 rationale	be-
ing	evidence	from	the	Earth’s	history	that	greater	warmings	are	
likely	 to	 cause	 large	 sea	 level	 change,	which,	 he	 argues,	will	
occur	on	a	time	scale	of	centuries.	We	discuss	the	sea	level	issue	
in	section	6.1.1	and	regional	climate	effects	in	6.1.2,	describing	
additional	evidence	in	support	of	the	contention	that	a	level	of	
global	warming	as	low	as	1°C	can	have	dangerous	effects.
	 6.1.1.	Global	 temperature	 and	 sea	 level.	 Simulated	 21st	
century	climate	change	can	be	used	 to	drive	 ice	 sheet	models	
that	calculate	the	expected	contribution	of	ice	sheets	to	sea	level	
change.	Wild et al.	[2003]	include	ice	sheet	calculations	within	
their high-resolution (T-106) global climate model with a BAU 
scenario	 that	has	CO2 reaching 715 ppm in 2100, finding that both	the	Greenland	and	Antarctic	ice	sheets	grow,	contributing	a	
12	cm/century	fall	to	sea	level	change.	Huybrechts et al.	[2004]	
use	 a	 3-D	 thermomechanical	 ice	 sheet/ice	 shelf	model	 driven	
by	 climate	 change	 produced	 by	 general	 circulation	 models	
(ECHAM4 and HadAM3H), finding mass loss from Greenland, 
larger	mass	gain	by	Antarctica,	with	little	net	sea	level	change	by	
2100.
	 We	question	whether	such	ice	sheet	models	adequately	rep-
resent	all	physics	that	is	important	during	the	wet	process	of	ice	
sheet	disintegration	in	a	warming	climate.	Explicit	modeling	of	
ice streams that channel flow of ice to the ocean may be needed, 
including	 effects	of	 rainfall	 and	melt	 percolation	 through	cre-
vasses	and	moulins,	as	well	as	the	removal	of	ice	shelves	by	the	
warming	ocean	and	dynamical	propagation	inland	of	effects	due	
to	thinning	and	retreat	of	coastal	ice.	Increased	snowfall	in	ice	
sheet	 interiors	provides	one	negative	 feedback,	but	with	BAU	
warming	of	several	degrees	Celsius	over	the	ice	sheets	most	of	
Greenland	and	West	Antarctica	would	be	bathed	in	summer	melt.	
As	the	area	of	melt	increases,	ice	shelves	are	lost,	and	coastal	ice	
thins,	positive	feedbacks	due	to	decreasing	albedo	and	lowering	
ice	surface	may	feed	a	rapid	nonlinear	dynamical	response.
 Given the difficulty of modeling ice sheet response to warm-
ing,	it	is	useful	to	examine	the	Earth’s	history	for	evidence	of	ice	
sheet	response	to	prior	warmings.	Global	temperature	should	be	
a	meaningful	parameter	for	such	empirical	study.	It	is	shown	in	
Efficacy	[2005]	that	there	is	a	congruence	in	the	spatial	distribu-
tion	of	climate	response	to	most	global	forcing	mechanisms	nor-
malized by the effective (or fixed SST) forcing, with exceptions 
for	highly	localized	forcings	such	as	land-use	change	or	biomass	
burning aerosols, and with limitation to comparisons for a fixed 
distribution	of	continents.	This	approximate	equivalence	of	ef-
fective	 forcings	 increases	 the	 likelihood	of	a	meaningful	 rela-
tionship	between	global	temperature	and	climate	impacts	such	
as	sea	level	change.
	 The	highest	sea	level	in	the	past	half	million	years	was	at	
most	~	+5	m	relative	to	today.	A	case	has	been	made	for	higher	
sea	level	~400	Kybp	[Hearty et al.,	1999],	but	there	are	dating	
uncertainties	and	it	is	likely	that	this	higher	stand	occurred	at	a	
much	earlier	 time	 [Droxler et al.,	2002].	 It	 is	necessary	 to	go	
back to the Pliocene, about 3 million years ago, to find sea levels 
clearly	much	greater	than	today.	Sea	level	then	is	estimated	to	
have	been	25	±	10	m	higher	 than	 today	 [Barrett et al.,	 1992;	
Dowsett et al.,	 1994;	 Dwyer et al.,	 1995].	 Maximum	 global	
temperatures	 during	 interglacial	 periods	 of	 the	 past	 half	 mil-
lion	years	were	probably	about	+1°C	relative	to	today;	Antarctic	
temperatures	 in	 some	 interglacial	periods	 reached	about	+2°C	
[Petit et al.,	1999],	but	tropical	maxima	were	<	+1°C	[Medina-
Elizade and Lea,	2005;	Hansen et al.,	2006a].	The	middle	Plio-
cene	was	about	+3°C	relative	to	today	[Crowley,	1996;	Dowsett 
et al.,	1996].
	 Long-term	 global	 ice	 volume	 changes	 tend	 to	 lag	 global	
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temperature	change	by	a	few	thousand	years	[Mudelsee,	2001],	
but	these	changes	are	in	response	to	weak	forcings	varying	on	
millennial	time	scales	[Hays et al.,	1976].	Nevertheless,	at	some	
ice	age	terminations	ice	volume	change	is	rapid,	e.g.,	the	largest	
sea	 level	 rise	 following	 the	 last	 ice	 age,	Meltwater	Pulse	 1A,	
when	 sea	 level	 rose	 about	20	m	 in	400	years,	was	practically	
synchronous	with	 the	Bolling	warming	 [Kienast et al.,	 2003].	
Other studies provide evidence of large (~ 10 m or more) chang-
es	of	sea	level	on	“sub-orbital”	time	scales	[Siddall et al.,	2003;	
Potter et al.,	 2004;	Thompson and Goldstein,	 2005],	 i.e.,	 sea	
level	changes	occurring	much	more	rapidly	than	changes	of	the	
Earth’s	orbital	elements.
	 GHG	climate	forcings	in	the	IPCC	BAU	scenarios,	such	as	
A1FI,	A2	and	A1B,	are	far	outside	the	range	that	has	existed	on	
Earth	in	millions	of	years.	The	rate	of	change	of	this	sustained	
forcing	exceeds	 that	of	known	 forcings	 in	 at	 least	millions	of	
years.	Global	warming	 in	 the	BAU	 scenarios,	with	 canonical	
climate	sensitivity	~	3°C	for	doubled	CO2,	is	~	3°C	by	2100	and	still	rising	rapidly.	By	2100	the	melt	area	on	Greenland	and	West	
Antarctica	and	 the	melt	 rate	of	 ice	 shelves,	 if	 any	 ice	 shelves	
remain,	would	be	much	greater	 than	today.	Thus	it	 is	unlikely	
that the response time for significant ice sheet change could ex-
ceed centuries, because such response times (sea level change of 
meters per century) have occurred during the Pleistocene with 
much	smaller	forcings.
	 If	equilibrium	sea	level	rise	is	many	meters,	a	response	time	
of	centuries	provides	little	consolation	to	coastal	dwellers.	They	
would be faced with intermittent floods associated with storms 
and	continually	rebuilding	above	a	transient	sea	level.	Thus	we	
suggest that sea level change may define a low level for global 
warming	that	constitutes	dangerous	change,	due	to	the	large	con-
centration	of	people	and	infrastructure	along	global	coastlines.
	 Present	understanding	of	ice	sheet	response	to	global	warm-
ing does not allow sharp definition of a ‘dangerous’ level, but 
BAU	scenarios	are	surely	well	into	the	dangerous	regime.	Even	
global	warming	of	1°C	conceivably	could	produce	a	long-term	
sea	level	rise	of	several	meters	[Otto-Bleisner et al.,	2006;	Over-
peck et al.,	2006].	However,	climate	forcing	on	the	ice	sheets	is	
far	smaller	with	global	warming	<	1°C	than	with	global	warming	
2-3°C,	and	the	resulting	slower	changes	of	the	ice	sheets	would	
allow	a	better	chance	to	develop	climate	mitigation	strategies	or	
adapt	to	sea	level	change.
	 6.1.2.	Regional	 climate	effects.	Regional	 climate	 change	
also	yields	a	clear	distinction	between	BAU	scenarios	with	glob-
al	warming	~	3°C	and	an	alternative	scenario	that	keeps	global	
warming <~ 1°C. In the specific alternative scenario we have 
defined, global warming is 0.80°C in the 21st	century	for	a	model	
with	 climate	 sensitivity	2.9°C	 for	 doubled	CO2.	The	 resulting	change	of	 seasonal	mean	 temperature	 this	century	 is	 typically	
1-2	σ,	where	σ	is	the	standard	deviation	of	seasonal	temperature	
in	the	20th	century.	In	IPCC	BAU	scenarios,	the	average	change	
of	seasonal	mean	temperature	is	5-10	σ.
	 Ecosystems,	wildlife,	and	humans	thus	would	be	subjected	
in	the	BAU	scenarios	to	conditions	far	outside	their	local	range	
of	 experience.	 Perhaps	 humans,	 aided	 by	modern	 technology,	
may	adapt	readily	to	such	regional	climate	change.	Wildlife	and	
ecosystems,	 however,	 will	 not	 have	 that	 advantage,	 and	 their	
abilities	 to	migrate	may	be	limited	by	anthropogenic	and	geo-
graphic	 constraints	 on	 their	 locations.	We	 suggest	 that	 5-10σ	
changes	of	seasonal	temperature	are	prima facie	evidence	that	
the	BAU	scenarios	extend	well	into	the	range	of	“dangerous	an-
thropogenic	interference”.
	 Arctic	 climate	 change	 provides	 another	 possible	 criterion	
for	DAI.	The	strong	positive	feedback	between	sea	ice	area	and	
surface	albedo	makes	the	Arctic	one	of	the	most	sensitive	regions	
on	Earth	to	global	warming.	In	the	middle	Pliocene,	with	global	
temperature	2-3°C	warmer	than	today,	the	Arctic	was	ice-free	in	
the	warm	season.	Such	drastic	climate	change	would	have	del-
eterious	effects	on	wildlife	and	indigenous	people	[ACIA,	2004],	
constituting	what	many	people	would	agree	is	dangerous	anthro-
pogenic	interference	with	nature.
	 Thus,	from	the	perspective	of	the	Arctic,	IPCC	BAU	sce-
narios	 again	 yield	 dangerous	 climate	 change.	 Positive	 feed-
backs,	however,	can	be	minimized	by	keeping	 the	net	 forcing	
small.	We	suggest	that,	if	additional	CO2	growth	is	kept	small,	as	in	the	alternative	scenario,	and	if	some	of	the	climate	forcings	
that	are	most	effective	in	the	Arctic	are	reversed,	i.e.,	reduced	in	
absolute	magnitude,	it	may	be	possible	to	limit	or	even	eliminate	
further	Arctic	warming.	This	would	require	large	reductions	of	
CH4,	tropospheric	O3,	and	other	pollutants,	but	such	reductions	
would have ancillary benefits [West et al.,	2006;	Air Pollution 
Workshop,	www.giss.nasa.gov/meetings/pollution2005].
	 6.1.3.	Climate	feedbacks.	The	climate	sensitivity	of	¾°C	
per	W/m2 (about 3°C for doubled CO2) is inferred for the case in which	GHGs	and	ice	sheet	area	are	treated	as	forcings	[Hansen,	
2005b].	If	climate	change	is	small	enough,	say	in	the	range	of	
the	interglacial	periods	of	the	past	million	years,	the	areas	of	the	
Greenland and Antarctica ice sheets should not change signifi-
cantly,	and	the	positive	feedback	of	increasing	GHGs	with	in-
creasing	global	temperature	is	small	[+18	ppm	CO2	per	°C,	+49	ppb	CH4	per	°C,	+15	ppb	N2O	per	°C,	Hansen and Sato,	2004].	However,	with	BAU	scenarios	the	expected	global	warming	ex-
tends	far	outside	the	range	of	recent	interglacial	periods,	raising	
the	possibility	of	much	larger	feedbacks	such	as	destabilization	
of methane hydrates (section 4.2.3).
 Although we lack sufficient information for quantitative 
analysis,	the	existence	of	climate	feedbacks	appears	to	present	
the	possibility	of	a	dichotomy	between	climate	futures	such	as	
the	alternative	scenario,	which	keeps	global	warming	less	than	
1°C,	and	BAU	scenarios.	If	the	warming	is	less	than	1°C,	it	ap-
pears	that	strong	positive	feedbacks	are	not	unleashed,	judging	
from	recent	Earth	history.	On	the	other	hand,	if	global	warming	
gets	well	 out	 of	 this	 range,	 there	 is	 a	 possibility	 that	 positive	
feedbacks	could	set	 in	motion	climate	changes	 far	outside	 the	
range	of	 recent	experience.	The	ability	of	 the	ocean	 to	absorb	
human-made	CO2	decreases	as	the	emissions	increase	[Archer,	2005],	there	is	a	possibility	that	the	terrestrial	biosphere	could	
even	become	a	source	of	CO2	[Cox et al.	2000],	and	even	a	po-tential	 that	 large	 amounts	 of	methane	 could	 be	 released	 from	
methane	hydrates,	as	discussed	in	section	4.2.3.
6.2.	Can	We	Avoid	Dangerous	Climate	Change?
 Global warming in “business-as-usual” (BAU) climate 
forcing	scenarios,	for	climate	sensitivity	consistent	with	paleo-
climate data, is at least 2-3°C by 2100 (relative to 2000) and still 
increasing	rapidly.	Implications	include	an	ice-free	Arctic	in	the	
warm	season,	other	regional	climate	changes	outside	the	range	
of	historical	experience,	and	initiation	of	ice	sheet	changes	that	
presage	future	sea	level	change	out	of	humanity’s	control.	The	
Earth,	in	a	broad	sense,	would	be	a	different	planet	than	the	one	
that	existed	for	the	past	10	millennia.
	 Have	we	 already	 passed	 a	 “tipping	 point”	 such	 that	 it	 is	
now	impossible	to	avoid	“dangerous”	climate	change	[Lovelock,	
2006]?	In	our	estimation,	we	probably	have	not,	but	we	must	be	
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very	close	to	such	a	point.	It	is	still	feasible	to	achieve	a	scenario	
that	keeps	additional	global	warming	under	1°C,	yielding	a	de-
gree	 of	 climate	 change	 that	 is	 quantitatively	 and	 qualitatively	
different	than	under	BAU	scenarios.
	 The	 ‘alternative’	scenario,	designed	 to	keep	warming	 less	
than 1°C, has a significantly smaller forcing than any of the 
IPCC	 scenarios.	 In	 recent	 years	 net	 growth	 of	 all	 real	 world	
greenhouse	gases	has	run	just	slightly	ahead	of	 the	alternative	
scenario,	with	the	excess	due	to	continued	growth	of	CO2	emis-sions	at	about	2%/year.	CO2	emissions	would	need	to	level	out	soon	and	decline	before	mid-century	to	approximate	the	alterna-
tive	scenario.	Moderate	changes	of	emissions	growth	rate	have	
a	marked	effect	after	decades,	as	shown	by	comparison	to	BAU	
scenarios.	Early	decreases	in	emissions	growth,	albeit	small,	are	
the	most	effective.
	 The	alternative	scenario	target,	keeping	added	CO2	to	~	80	ppm	between	2000	and	2050,	may	already	be	impractical	due	to	
the	2%/year	growth	of	CO2	emissions	in	the	past	decade.	How-ever,	the	net	greenhouse	forcing	could	still	meet	the	alternative	
scenario	target	via	the	combination	of	a	still	feasible	slowdown	
and	reduction	of	CO2	emissions	together	with	aggressive	abso-lute	 reductions	of	CH4	and	O3	 and	a	 slowdown	 in	 the	growth	of	N2O.	Reduction	of	non-CO2 forcings has benefits for human health	 and	 agriculture	 [West et al.,	 2005;	Air Pollution Work-
shop,	 www.giss.nasa.gov/meetings/pollution2005],	 as	 well	 as	
for	climate.	Reduction	of	non-CO2	forcings	is	especially	effec-tive	in	limiting	Arctic	climate	change	[section	6.2.1	above;	Shin-
dell et al.,	2006].
	 Continued	 rapid	growth	of	CO2	emissions	 and	 infrastruc-ture	for	another	decade	may	make	attainment	of	the	alternative	
scenario	impractical	if	not	impossible.	Because	wide-scale	use	
of	power	plants	with	CO2	sequestration	is	at	least	a	decade	away,	
near-term emphasis on energy efficiency and renewable ener-
gy	 is	 needed	 to	minimize	 construction	 of	 previous-generation	
pulverized-coal	power	plants.	Such	power	plants	are	a	primary	
cause	of	increasing	CO2	emissions,	and	their	construction	com-mits	 the	world	 to	high	CO2	 emissions	or	 high	 costs	 of	 power	plant	replacement.	Potential	energy	savings	from	improved	ef-
ficiency, even in developed countries, are sufficient to cover in-
creased	energy	demand	for	the	1-2	decades	needed	to	develop	
improved	energy	technologies	[Romm et al.,	1998;	Pacala and 
Socolow,	2004;	NCEP,	2004].
	 Human-made	 aerosols	 cause	 a	 net	 negative	 climate	 forc-
ing that we estimate (Figure 1) as about half the magnitude of 
positive	greenhouse	gas	forcing.	Thus	aerosols	have	diminished	
global	warming	in	what	Hansen and Lacis	[1990]	call	a	“Faus-
tian	bargain”.	As	humanity	reduces	particulate	air	pollution	 in	
the	 future,	 a	 payment	 in	 increased	 global	warming	will	 come	
due	[Andreae et al.,	2005].	With	appropriate	understanding	of	
the	 aerosol	 forcing,	 however,	 it	may	 be	 possible	 to	minimize	
warming	 effects	 of	 air	 pollution	 reduction.	The	 direct	 aerosol	
forcing	can	be	reduced	via	emphasis	on	reduction	of	black	car-
bon (soot) aerosols that cause warming [Hansen et al.,	2000;	Ja-
cobson,	2001].	The	aerosol	indirect	effect	is	non-linear,	with	the	
first aerosols added having greatest effect [Menon et al.,	2002].	
Thus	retention	of	a	small	amount	of	aerosols,	perhaps	in	remote	
areas,	 may	 minimize	 warming.	 Better	 knowledge	 of	 aerosol	
properties	and	their	effects	is	needed	for	analysis.
	 A	scenario	that	avoids	“dangerous”	climate	change	appears	
to	be	still	technically	feasible.	The	fact	that	the	recent	trend	of	
global	GHG	 climate	 forcing	 remains	 close	 to	 the	 ‘alternative	
scenario’	 that	 we	 estimate	 as	 necessary	 to	 avoid	 ‘dangerous’	
climate	change	provides	some	basis	for	optimism.	In	addition,	
we	are	entering	an	era	in	which	the	reality	of	climate	change	is	
becoming	increasingly	apparent,	and	it	 is	clear	that	the	effects	
of	climate	change,	especially	sea	level	rise,	will	be	widespread,	
affecting	both	developed	and	developing	countries.
	 Reduction	of	climate	forcing	is	a	global	problem,	as	quan-
tified in Figure 9, and thus it presents an unusual challenge to 
attain	 needed	 international	 cooperation.	 For	 this	 reason	 it	 is	
particularly important that the scientific understanding of cli-
mate	 change	 and	 its	 implications	 be	 transmitted	 to	 the	 public	
and	policy	makers,	and	the	message	must	be	understandable	and	
believable	 if	 it	 is	 to	help	produce	 the	actions	needed	 to	avoid	
dangerous	climate	change.
	 Our	conclusion	that	global	temperature	is	nearing	the	level	
of	dangerous	climate	effects	implies	that	little	time	remains	to	
achieve	 the	 international	 cooperation	 needed	 to	 avoid	 wide-
spread	undesirable	consequences.	CO2	emissions	are	the	critical	issue,	because	a	substantial	fraction	of	these	emissions	remain	
in the atmosphere “forever”, for practical purposes (Figure 10a). 
The	principal	implication	is	that	avoidance	of	dangerous	climate	
change	requires	the	bulk	of	coal	and	unconventional	fossil	fuel	
resources	to	be	exploited	only	under	condition	that	CO2	emis-sions	are	captured	and	sequestered.	A	second	 inference	 is	 that	
remaining	gas	and	oil	resources	must	be	husbanded,	so	that	their	
role	in	critical	functions	such	as	mobile	fuels	can	be	stretched	
until	acceptable	alternatives	are	available,	thus	avoiding	a	need	
to	squeeze	such	fuels	from	unconventional	and	environmentally	
damaging	sources.	The	 task	 is	 to	achieve	a	 transition	 to	clean	
carbon-free	energy	sources,	which	are	essential	on	the	long	run,	
without	pushing	the	climate	system	beyond	a	level	where	disas-
trous	irreversible	effects	become	inevitable.
	 These	 stark	 conclusions	 about	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 global	
climate	change	and	implications	for	fossil	fuel	use	are	not	yet	
appreciated	by	essential	governing	bodies,	as	evidenced	by	on-
going plans to build coal-fired power plants without CO2	cap-ture	and	sequestration.	 In	our	view,	 there	 is	an	acute	need	 for	
science	 to	 inform	society	about	 the	costs	of	 failure	 to	address	
global	warming,	because	of	a	fundamental	difference	between	
the	threat	posed	by	climate	change	and	most	prior	global	threats.	
In	 the	 nuclear	 standoff	 between	 the	 Soviet	Union	 and	United	
States,	a	crisis	could	be	precipitated	only	by	action	of	one	of	the	
parties.	In	contrast,	the	present	threat	to	the	planet	and	civiliza-
tion,	with	the	United	States	and	China	now	the	principal	players,	
requires only inaction in the face of clear scientific evidence of 
the	danger	of	increased	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	Thus	scien-
tists are faced with difficult choices between communication of 
scientific information to the public and focus on basic research, 
as there are inherent compromises in any specific balance.
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